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CORRECTION THROUGH COERCION: DO STATE
MANDATED ALCOHOL AND DRUG TREATMENT
PROGRAMS IN PRISONS VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Rachel F. Calabro
INTRODUCTION
Over sixty percent of federal prison inmates are incarcerated for
drug and alcohol offenses.1 The Bureau of Justice Statistics predicts
that by the year 2000, eighty percent of all people in jails and prisons
will be there because of substance abuse problems.2 It has been sug-
gested that these statistics help to explain why prisons tend to exceed
their maximum capacity. 3 Because of the overpopulation problem,
prison chiefs often seek acceptable mechanisms to provide early pa-
role to prisoners.4 One such mechanism involves the early release of
substance-abusing inmates who participate in drug and alcohol reha-
bilitation programs.5
Several prisons have implemented such drug and alcohol rehabilita-
tion programs, and most are based on the program designed by Al-
coholics Anonymous ("A.A."), and its drug-rehabilitation spin-off,
Narcotics Anonymous ("N.A.") 6 As an example, the State of New
York has developed a program-the Alcohol and Substance Abuse
Treatment Program ("ASAT")-which provides treatment for chemi-
1. Jennifer E. Smith & Janet E. Williams, Treatment is Beyond Reach of Poorer Addicts, INDI-
ANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 10, 1996, at A10.
2. Id. According to substance abuse coordinator Mary McDaniel at Indiana's Marion County
Jail, about 90% of jail inmates at Marion County have substance abuse problems. Id.
3. See Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is
Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 615 (1988).
4. Id.
5. Byron K. Henry, Note & Comment, In "A Higher Power" We Trust: Alcoholics Anonymous
as a Condition of Probation and Establishment of Religion, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 443, 443
(1997).
6. See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 1996); O'Connor v. California, 855 F.
Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261,
265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *3-4 (S.D.
Iowa Apr. 29, 1993); Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp 1014, 1016-18 (D. Kan. 1991); Youle v.
Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988); Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole, 956 S.W.2d
478, 484 (Tenn. 1997).
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cally dependent inmates. 7 According to the ASAT Program Opera-
tions Manual, the primary mission of ASAT is to prepare chemically
dependent inmates for return to the community "by providing educa-
tion and counseling focused on continued abstinence from all mood
altering substances ... and [through] participation in self-help groups
based on the '12-step' approach of A.A. 8
Advocates of A.A. and N.A.-based rehabilitation programs9 profess
that these self-help rehabilitation programs are attractive to state
agencies because they have proven effective in rehabilitating sub-
stance abusers and reducing recidivism.' 0 Moreover, these groups
represent an economical option for cash-poor state and federal pris-
ons because the programs are free, while other private detoxification
and counseling programs can be quite costly."
Even though these programs have the substantial, practical effect of
creating sober and, thus, safer communities (and safer prisons as well),
the use of these self-help rehabilitation programs is in direct conflict
with one of the fundamental premises in the United States Constitu-
tion-the separation of church and state.' 2 When the State conditions
benefits for an inmate on attendance at these self-help treatment pro-
grams, it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
7. See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681
(1997) (holding "that under the Establishment Clause, an atheistic or agnostic inmate may not
be deprived of eligibility for expanded family visitation privileges for refusing to participate in
the sole alcohol and drug addiction program at his State correctional facility when the program
necessarily entails mandatory attendance at and participation in a curriculum which adopts...
religious-oriented [antics] and [the] precepts of Alcoholics Anonymous"); see also infra notes
290-315 and accompanying text.
8. Griffin, 673 N.E. 2d at 102 (referring to the ASAT manual). Alcoholics Anonymous bases
its program on twelve steps which an alcoholic must follow in order to reach full recovery. See
infra note 247.
9. The terms "self-help rehabilitation program" and "self-help treatment program" will be
used throughout this Comment as a compact way of referring to drug and alcohol rehabilitation
programs that are based on the unique, twelve-step, self-help approach which is the foundation
of A.A. and N.A.
10. See E.J. Khantzian & John E. Mack, How AA Works and Why It's Important for Clinicians
to Understand, 11 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 77, 78 (1994) (discussing how A.A. is effec-
tive because it is a sophisticated group psychology that effectively accesses, corrects, or repairs
core psychological vulnerabilities); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SEV-
ENTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 412, 412-15 (1989).
11. Alcoholics Anonymous is operated by volunteers and is fully self-supporting. AL-
COHOLICs ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., THE TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS
160 (1989); see also Robert Zimmerman, A Newer Bigger Effort to Reverse the Tide of Alcohol
Abuse, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 8, 1990, at C7 (discussing the overhaul of substance
abuse treatment from expensive clinical treatment programs to the use of less costly alteration,
such as A.A.).
12. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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because these programs rely on spirituality and trust in God to suc-
cessfully treat alcohol and drug abusers. 13 Allowing the State to dan-
gle the carrot of early parole in exchange for participation in these
self-help rehabilitation programs effectively permits the State to es-
tablish a nationally-supported religion, to impermissibly coerce the
prisoner, and to compromise the principle of separation of church and
state.14
Until recently, courts have generally allowed this practice of state-
established religion and coercion. 15 Such courts have reasoned that
these self-help rehabilitation programs do not establish nor impose
religion on the inmate.' 6 Instead, the courts have applauded the
states' efforts in implementing self-help treatment programs in pris-
ons. 17 Furthermore, courts have justified their decisions by insisting
that states have a strong and legitimate penological interest in assur-
ing that inmates are detoxified before their release.' 8 These courts
have held that the primary function of self-help rehabilitation pro-
grams is to treat alcoholism or addiction, not to forge religion; accord-
ingly, the States interest outweighs the slight deprivation of a
prisoner's liberty.19 Recently, however, two United States Courts of
Appeal-the Second and Seventh Circuits-and a state supreme court
have diverged from this arcane line of reasoning, holding that compul-
sory attendance at certain self-help treatment programs constitutes es-
tablishment of, and coerced participation in, a state-sponsored
religion.20
This Comment discusses why the use of A.A. and N.A.-based pro-
grams, as a condition of early release from prison, is a violation of the
Establishment Clause. After grappling with the difficult task of deci-
phering the courts' various definitions of religion, this Comment ar-
gues that these self-help rehabilitation programs proselytize Western
religious philosophies through prayer and submission to "God." This
13. See infra Section I.A.
14. Another incentive for prison inmates has been family visitation rights. See Griffin v.
Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997). States have also
mandated treatment programs for those convicted of Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") of-
fenders as an alternative to jail. See O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 305 (C.D. Cal
1994); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
15. See infra notes 127-64 and accompanying text.
16. Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *3 (S.D. Iowa April 29, 1993);
Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (D. Kan. 1991).
17. See infra notes 127-64 and accompanying text.
18. Stafford, 766 F. Supp. at 1017.
19. Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 899 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
20. Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 472 (7th Cir. 1996); Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 101
(N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
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Comment also compares those cases in which the courts have held
that A.A. and N.A. are valid state-sponsored treatment programs with
opinions that have recently declared that such programs violate the
requirement of separation of church and state.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Alcoholics
Anonymous program and the prevailing law concerning Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. 21 This section reviews the courts' struggle
with religion cases as manifested by their inability to produce a uni-
versal definition of religion. This section also presents a summary of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, concentrating on the long-stand-
ing Lemon test and the up-and-coming coercion test, both of which
have been used to determine Establishment Clause violations.
Part II of this Comment reviews the application of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in mandatory self-help rehabilitation program
cases. First presented are those cases in which courts have used the
Lemon test to find that such self-help programs do not violate the
Establishment Clause. Reviewed next are those cases in which courts
found that the same programs do, in fact, contravene the Establish-
ment Clause.
After having reviewed the cases, Part III argues that the Second
and Seventh Circuits are correct in using the coercion test to find a
violation of the Establishment Clause, rather than the arcane Lemon
test. This is accomplished by demonstrating A.A.'s alignment with
religious tenets and its proselytization of those beliefs during the
course of self-help rehabilitation sessions; and, additionally, by argu-
ing that the spiritual transformation demanded by A.A. confirms the
program's religious nature.
To prevent state authorities from committing future Establishment
Clause violations, Part IV recommends an alternative to A.A., and
suggests modifications to the program which will assure compliance
with Establishment Clause requirements.
21. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause have been the focus of extensive
discussion, and the tension between these First Amendment clauses has been the subject of
much debate. This Comment, however, is confined to a discussion of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. For a broader discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, see generally Michael W. Mc-
Connell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 1409 (1990). For a discussion of the tenuous relationship between the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause, see generally Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1980).
[Vol. 47:565
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I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE GENERALLY
The Supreme Court's treatment of Establishment Clause issues has
"undergone substantial changes during the last half of this century. '22
The Court has questioned the practices that were common during the
first 150 years following the passage of the First Amendment.23 The
transformation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be attrib-
uted to the difficulty in defining religion and to the Court's attempt to
incorporate modern ideas of religion into its analysis.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has evolved over the past two
centuries from acknowledging that, "we are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," 24 to recognizing that athe-
ism, which is rooted in not worshipping any deity, should also benefit
from these same constitutional protections.2 5 Certain members of the
United States Supreme Court have maintained that, at a minimum:
"The [Establishment] Clause does absolutely prohibit government-fi-
nanced or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a
particular religious faith."' 26 Further, these justices have asserted that
the First Amendment: "[Forbids] all laws respecting an establishment
of religion."'27 Accordingly, these justices have given the First
Amendment a "broad intepretation... in the light of history and the
evils it was designed to suppress. '28
In order for a prison-based self-help rehabilitation program to vio-
late the Establishment Clause, it must first be determined that the
22. Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
23. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
24. Warner, 827 F. Supp. at 264 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
25. On the basis of Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the court in Warner
held that atheism fell within the protection of the First Amendment as "anti-religion" or "non-
religion." Id.
26. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 21 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
27. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947)).
28. Id. The evils the Court referred to are: corruption by the government, repression of com-
peting views, and promotion of sectarian violence. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom (1785), reprinted in ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A
NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 110 (1990) [hereinafter RELIGIoUs LIBERTY] (op-
posing the Virginia bill to establish relgious teachers in part because it "assumed dominion over
the faith of others... and ... destroys religious liberty"); James Madison, Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments No. 7 (1785), reprinted in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY supra, at
104 (explaining how ecclesiastical establishments, rather than those which strive to maintain the
purity and efficacy of religion, damage government structures); James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments No. 11 (1785), reprinted in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
supra, at 108 ("Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular
arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinion.").
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program constitutes a religion.29 After which, it must be determined
whether the government sponsors that program, either through public
money or encouragement through regulations. 30 A number of tests
have been developed, and subsequently criticized, to make such deter-
minations.31 Specifically, the Lemon test and the coercion test have
been applied to cases in which the government has been accused of
establishing or sponsoring religion.32 Whether or not the government
action has violated the Establishment Clause often depends upon
which of the two tests is used.33 If the program is not a religion, or
does not qualify as sufficiently religious, then First Amendment scru-
tiny is not triggered. If a contrary result is reached, the existence of an
Establishment Clause violation will turn on whether the state coerced
the inmate to participate in the program.34 As a result, a discussion of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence should begin with a review of the
manner in which courts have answered the question: What is religion?
A. Defining Religion
The first step in determining an Establishment Clause violation is
deciding whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose. 35 In
other words, for the statute to be unconstitutional, the statute-author-
ized action or organization must constitute religion. This, by far, is the
most contentious part of mandated treatment program cases or any
Establishment Clause cases. The Constitution, unfortunately, does
29. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Section I.B.1., discussing the Lemon test, and Section I.B.2., offering the coer-
cion test as an alternative to Lemon.
32. See infra notes 68-120 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 127-82, 183-238 and accompanying text.
34. The test to decide whether state action exists is: "[W]hether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)). The
state action doctrine has been analyzed in the race discrimination context. See, e.g., Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (holding that a restaurant's refusal to serve African-
Americans because of a local ordinance requiring segregation of races in such places was tanta-
mount to the State having "commanded a particular result"); cf. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354-55
(holding a private utility's termination of the petitioner's electric service did not constitute "state
action" merely because the state "specifically authorized and approved" the termination prac-
tice, where the termination provision of the utility's general tariff filed with the state's utilities
commission had appeared in the utility's previously filed tariffs for many years but had, in fact,
never been the subject of a hearing or other scrutiny by the Commission). According to the
Supreme Court, where the impetus for discrimination is private, the state must have significantly
involved itself with invidious discriminations in order for the discriminatory action to fall within
the ambit of the constitutional prohibition. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173.
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
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not define the word "religion," 36 and the framers gave little direction
as to what the word meant for purposes of First Amendment protec-
tion.37 Therefore, the courts have been left with the task of distin-
guishing religion from non-religion in the course of determining
exactly what is prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Many com-
mentators have suggested ways to determine what constitutes religion
under the Constitution, 38 and various lower courts have attempted to
develop a generic definition. 39 Nevertheless, the definition remains an
unsettled question of constitutional law.
One scholar notes that undoubtedly, "the framers (sic) religion en-
tailed a relationship between human beings and some Supreme Be-
ing."'40 The key to religion, this scholar argues, is not the name or
nature of a Supreme Being, but the role that "a sacred or transcenden-
tal reality plays in imposing obligations upon the religious faithful. '41
The Supreme Court has also attempted to differentiate that which
constitutes religion from that which is merely ideology.4 2 In United
36. The word "religion" appears in only two places in the Constitution: the First Amendment
and Article VI.
37. One commentator explained: "There is no doubt that, to the Framers, religion entailed a
relationship of man to some Supreme Being ... [but] while they were theists, there is no clear
evidence that the founders wished to protect only theism." Note, Toward a Constitutional Defi-
nition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1060 (1978).
38. See, e.g., Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem,
11 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1977); A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion in Operational and
Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); George C. Freeman III, The Misguided
Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEo. L.J. 1519 (1983); Paul Horwitz,
Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts on Selected Issues in Law and
Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 127-43 (1997); Steven D. Collier, Comment, Beyond Seegeri
Welsh: Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 973 (1982).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that philos-
ophy and/or way of life are not religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Africa v.
Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025, 1035 (3rd Cir. 1981) (beliefs are secular when they "are more
akin to Thoreau's rejection of 'the contemporary values accepted by the majority' than to the
'deep religious conviction[s]' of the Amish"); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3rd Cir.
1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (presenting ideas that lay claim to an ultimate and comprehensive
truth of the meaning of life, death, our role in the Universe and moral code through "formal,
external or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions"); Berman v. United
States, 156 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding that beliefs which are merely moral and
social in nature, as opposed to pertaining to a belief in a Supreme Being, are not religious).
40. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REv. 233, 250 (1989).
41. Id. at 240.
42. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (stating that philosophical and per-
sonal beliefs are secular beliefs); United States v. Welch, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (defining
religion under the conscientous objector exemption as including those beliefs that are purely
ethical and moral); Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (explaining that, under the
conscientous objector exemption, religion includes any deeply-held belief that becomes of "ulti-
mate concern" to an individual and "a belief that is sincere and meaningful [and that] occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God").
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States v. Seeger,43 the Supreme Court affirmed the importance of a
supreme being when defining religion: "[Religion must be] based
upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate
or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." 44 The connection be-
tween the individual and the supreme being must involve duties supe-
rior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely
personal moral code.45
One of the most thorough treatments of the meaning of "religion"
may be found in the concurring opinion of Judge Adams in Malnak v.
Yogi. 46 In Malnak, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit ruled that the Science of Creative Intelligence-Transcenden-
tal Meditation ("SCI/TM"), as taught in the New Jersey public
schools, was a religion. 47 As part of the SCI/TM course, students were
required to read a textbook developed by the founder of SCI/TM, the
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, and to bring fruit, flowers, and a white scarf
to a ceremony in which the teacher chanted and made offerings to a
deity.48 While the court's majority failed to provide an explanation
for its holding, it affirmed the lower court's decision that ceremonies,
chanting, presenting sacrificial goods, and teaching from a book writ-
ten by the Maharishi were characteristics that sufficiently qualified
SCI/TM as a religion.49
In his concurrence, Judge Adams opined that the definition of reli-
gion should be discussed at length and not given just cursory atten-
43. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
44. Id. at 176.
45. Id. at 178.
46. 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3rd Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). The Tenth Circuit also has given
a comprehensive description of religion through its affirmation of the lower court's decision in
United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996). In Meyers, the Tenth Circuit stated that
whether or not beliefs constitute a religion turns on a variety of factors, including the following:
(1) whether the beliefs constitute ultimate ideas addressing fundamental questions of life, pur-
pose and death or are metaphysical beliefs which address a reality that transcends the physical
and immediately apparent world; (2) whether the beliefs are a moral and ethical system pre-
scribed by a particular manner of acting or way of life; (3) whether the belief system is suffi-
ciently comprehensive; and, (4) whether the beliefs are accompanied by accoutrements of
religion, such as holy places, holy ceremonies and rituals, a founder, prophet, or teacher who is
considered to be divine, enlightened, gifted or blessed, and other such characteristics commonly
associated with religion. Id. at 1483-84.
47. Mafnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (affirming the lower court's holding that The Science of Creative
Intelligence-Transcendental Meditation ("SCI/TM") was religious activity for purposes of the
Establishment Clause, and that the First Amendment prohibits teaching of SCIITM in public
schools).
48. Id. at 198.
49. Id. at 199.
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tion.5° He characterized the modern definition of religion as a
"definition by analogy" and explained that, "[t]he modern approach
... looks to the familiar religions as models in order to ascertain, by
comparison, whether the new set of ideas or beliefs is confronting the
same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as unquestioned and
accepted 'religions.' '"51 According to Judge Adams, "[t]here appear
to be three useful indicia that are basic to our traditional religions and
that are themselves related to the values that undergird the first
amendment."52 The first and most important criterion is "the 'ulti-
mate' nature of the ideas presented. ' 53 Such ideas are concerned with
"the meaning of life and death, man's role in the Universe, [and] the
proper moral code of right and wrong. '54 However, in Judge Adams'
view, an idea is not religious simply because it addresses an ultimate
question.5 5 Second, a religion must, Judge Adams maintained, " [lay
a] claim to an ultimate and comprehensive 'truth." 56 Finally, Judge
Adams's test analyzes the "formal, external, or surface signs that may
be analogized to accepted religions. ' 57 Formal services, ceremonial
functions, the existence of clergy, and a structural organization are
just a few examples that fit into this category. 58
Two years after Malnak, in Africa v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania,59 Judge Adams modified his approach and set a standard for
distinguishing between secular beliefs and religious beliefs. According
to him, beliefs are secular rather than religious when they are more
akin to the rejection of "the contemporary values accepted by the ma-
jority ... [than to] deep religious conviction[s]. ''60
As religious beliefs throughout the United States diversified, the
Supreme Court responded by expanding its definition of religion to
encompass nontheistic religions. 61 The Court broadened its definition
of religion to include a person's "ultimate concern"-a "belief that is
50. Id. at 200 (Adams, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 207.
52. Id. at 207-08.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 208-09.
56. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
57. ld.
58. Id.
59. 662 F.2d 1025 (3rd Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 1035.
61. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (stating that state and federal gov-
ernments cannot "constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs" (citations omitted)).
1998]
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sincere and meaningful [and that] occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God. '62
However, after many attempts to define religion, the courts have been
unable to agree on a single definition which distinguishes religion
from any other deep, sincere belief.
C. Establishment Clause and Applicable Tests
Although the Supreme Court has had difficulty deciding Establish-
ment Clause cases, the Court has been consistent in articulating cer-
tain principles at the heart of the clause: "Civil power must be
exercised in a manner neutral to religion, '63 neither favoring "one
religion to another [n]or religion to irreligion. ' 64 Traditionally, the
Court has found Establishment Clause violations only when the bene-
ficiaries of state action are clearly religious, such as Catholic schools 65
or Christian organizations. 66 When a state indirectly encourages reli-
gion, and the state support of religion is incidental to whatever is the
state's primary action, the Court will not find an Establishment Clause
violation.67 To determine whether or not the state has violated the
62. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 339 (1970) (explaining that under Seeger the "central consideration in determining whether
[a person's] beliefs are religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function
as a religion in the [person's] life").
63. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994).
64. Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985)).
65. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 804 (1973);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 804 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1947).
66. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
67. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 669 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that a statute or state
program may have the "remote and incidental" effect of advancing religion yet still not be an
Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 683; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603-04
(1988) (holding that federal funding of sex education projects does not violate the First Amend-
ment "simply because some of the goals of the statute coincide with the beliefs of religious
organizations" or because the statute lacked rigid limits preventing funding from intermingling
with religious support for the same programs); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980)
(holding that though strict limits on federal funding for abortions may reflect religious opinion,
they are constitutional; constitutional rights to religion or to abortion are freedoms from inter-
ference, not guarantees of financial support). But see Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710
(1985) (striking down a statute granting employees a right to work on Sabbath days, since obser-
vation of the Sabbath serves little or no secular purpose). Under the incidental benefit doctrine,
if the establishment or encouragement of religion only "accidentally" arises from a program
installed or supported by the state, and if the state's primary purpose was not to encourage
religion, than religion was only an incidental result of the program. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1210-18 (1996). Under this situation,
there would be no First Amendment violation. For example, in the case of drunk drivers being
sentenced to A.A. as a term of probation, the sentence is secular in purpose-to rehabilitate the
driver. Although religion may be advanced in the treatment program, the principal effect of the
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clause, the Court has developed and refined many tests, two of which
are applicable to mandated treatment programs in prisons: the Lemon
test and the coercion test.
1. The Lemon Test
The modern era of Establishment Clause jurisprudence began with
the Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.68 In Lemon, the Court
enunciated a three-part test to determine if a state unconstitutionally
established religion. To pass muster under the Establishment Clause,
the challenged state action, "first must have a secular legislative pur-
pose, second its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, finally [it] must not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. '69
In deciding whether a violation exists, the term "secular" has been
given a broad interpretation. 70 If government can point to a secular
purpose, its action is not struck down simply because the secular pur-
pose coincides with religious beliefs. 71 Thus, for example, Sunday
closing laws, which developed out of religious beliefs and practices,
have been upheld because the State may have a secular purpose of
giving shopkeepers a day of rest or encouraging workers to spend time
with their families once a week. 72 Under this situation, Christians
benefit because Sunday is, according to their Bible, the day of rest;
however, Jews, whose Sabbath begins sundown Friday and ends Satur-
day, are burdened because they would be unable to work for two days
out of the week-Saturday and Sunday. With few exceptions, 73 the
action arguably remains rehabilitation. Thus, this doctrine precludes a First Amendment viola-
tion and the sentencing survives constitutional muster. The incidental benefit doctrine is an
indication of the judiciary's acceptance of cooperation between the government and religious
institutions in the provision of social services. See generally Thomas W. Pickrell & Mitchell A.
Horwich, "Religion as an Engine of Civil Policy": A Comment on the First Amendment Limita-
tions on the Church-State Partnership in the Social Welfare Field, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1981, at 111 (discussing the incidental benefit doctrine). The long history of accommoda-
tion of religion where a program's purpose is sufficiently secular dates back to Bradfield v. Rob-
erts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), which affirmed state funding of a Catholic hospital. Id. at 299-300. The
Court reasoned that the secular purpose of the hospital was so important that the religious char-
acter was "wholly immaterial." Id. at 299.
68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
69. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
70. See id. at 612-14.
71. Id. at 612-13.
72. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435-37 (1960).
73. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (discussing how Sunday closing laws make
the religious practices of Orthodox Jewish merchants more expensive).
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Court easily finds a sufficient secular purpose and moves on to ad-
dress the other two factors.74
Even if the government has a sectarian purpose, its conduct only
violates the Establishment Clause if it has the essential effect of ad-
vancing religion.75 Certain types of effects are absolutely prohibited:
discrimination among different religious denominations; lending of
state powers to religious bodies; and the State borrowing the "aura of
legitimacy" from religion.76 Other effects are not as easily defined
and, thus, require a searching inquiry to determine whether the non-
secular effect is remote, indirect, and incidental. This leads to an ex-
amination of whether the secular purpose or effect can be sufficiently
separated from the religious effect-something which often cannot be
done. Some of the most difficult cases arise when government pro-
vides aid to a religious organization, such as financial support to a
parochial schools or to the students attending such schools. 77
The final prong of the Lemon78 test prohibits excessive church and
state entanglement. 79 Such entanglement might take the form of the
State turning traditional governmental power over to religious bod-
ies;80 government action or aid that leads to religiously motivated
political divisiveness;81 government regulation, particularly in the em-
ployment relationship, which leads to litigation seeking exemptions
for religious organizations;82 or government inquiry, through courts or
74. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 435-37, 453.
75. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
76. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 14, § 10, at 1214 (2d ed.
1988).
77. Professor Tribe identifies five factors which "are often relevant and sometimes disposi-
tive" in such cases. Id. at 1219-20. Some state courts have sustained statutes granting free trans-
portation or free schoolbooks to children attending denominational schools on the theory that
the aid was a benefit to the child rather than to the school. See Nichols v. Henry, 191 S.W.2d
930, 934-35 (Ky. 1945); Borden v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 123 So. 655, 661 (La. 1929); Adams
v. County Comm'rs, 26 A.2d 377, 380 (Md. 1942); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 199 A. 628, 632-33
(Md. 1938). Other courts have held such statutes unconstitutional under state constitutions as
aid to the schools. See Judd v. Board of Educ., 15 N.E.2d 576, 584-85 (N.Y. 1938); Smith v.
Donahue, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (App. Div. 1922); Mitchell v. Consolidated Sch. Dist., 135 P.2d 79, 82
(Wash. 1943).
78. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
79. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
80. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1982) (holding that a state
may not vest governing powers in a church which allows that church to veto applications for
liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of the church or school).
81. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota statute that
allowed the state to provide financial assistance to sectarian institutions).
82. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985)
(holding that when a religious foundation is subject to secular regulatory activity such as fire
inspections, building and zoning regulations, and record-keeping requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, this does not constitute a Free Exercise or Establishment Clause violation).
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agencies, into religious beliefs or doctrine.83 In practice, this last
prong has proven to be the deciding factor in Establishment Clause
cases.
84
Lemon, with its rigid framework, has proved over time "to be a
difficult structure to apply. ' 85 At best, its use is "unclear and unpre-
dictable" 86 and application of the Lemon test has often resulted in
contradictory decisions.87 Thus, scholars88 and Supreme Court Jus-
tices 89 have criticized the Lemon test. Furthermore, recent Supreme
83. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (affirming that a person may not
be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an
otherwise available public program; and holding that a state may not deny unemployment com-
pensation benefits to a claimant who terminated his job because of religious beliefs).
84. The court, in using the Lemon test, has generally focused its attention to the third prong of
the test. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 598-99, 615-16 (1988); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583, 585 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 672, 684, 686 (1984).
85. Kristin J. Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the
Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BuFF. L. REV. 147, 165 (1994).
86. Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3
(1992). According to Franklin: "The literal language of Lemon has remained intact but the
meaning attached to each of the three test questions has fluctuated depending on which Justice
wrote the Court's decision." Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
87. For example, Lynch and County of Allegheny were both decided using the Lemon frame-
work, however each application led to opposite conclusions. Lynch upheld the constitutionality
of a creche display, 465 U.S. at 685; while Allegheny invalidated a similar creche display, 492 U.S.
at 601-02.
88. For a critique of the Lemon test, see Kenneth Mitchell Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The
Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1175 (1984); Kristin M.
Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search
for a New Test, 27 PAC. L.J. 121 (1995); Graham, supra note 85, at 165-174.
89. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, main-
tained his criticism of Lemon. Id. at 91, 108-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Justice
Rehnquist, Lemon "has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the
wall theory upon which it rests." Id. at 110. Justice Rehnquist criticized the metaphor of the
wall which is supposed to separate church and State as "a metaphor based on bad history...
which has proved useless as a guide to judging ... [and should therefore be] ... "frankly and
explicitly abandoned." Id. at 107.
In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), Justice White voiced his criticism of the Lemon test, stating that, particu-
larly in the context of state aid to private schools, he "disagreed with the Court's interpretation
and application of the Establishment Clause" and that the Court, by applying the Lemon test has
acted contrary to the interests of the United States. Id. at 400 (White, J., dissenting).
In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Justice Scalia, in his dissent, expressed his
"doubt whether [the] 'purpose' requirement of Lemon [was] a proper interpretation of the Con-
stitution." Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Recently in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992),
Justice Scalia bitterly dissented and outwardly favored the "interment" of the Lemon test. Id. at
644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a comment on Justice Kennedy's declaration that Lemon need not
be reconsidered and would remain precedent in Establishment Clause issues, Justice Scalia
stated: "The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring it ...
and the interment of that case may be the one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamen-
table decision." Id.
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Court decisions, although neither directly overturning nor limiting the
Lemon test, indicate that the Court does not intend to rely so heavily
upon it.90 For example, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis-
trict,91 the Court upheld an Arizona statute that, pursuant to the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act,92 provided a deaf parochial
school student with a sign language interpreter. 93 Although these
funds were directed to a parochial (religious) school, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Court held this was permissible because the public
funds aided the parochial schools only as a result of the choice of par-
ents, not because of a requirement of the state. 94 Furthermore, the
aid was only indirect and, thus, permissible. 95 The difference between
direct and indirect aid, rather than the Lemon criteria, was the deter-
mining factor. 96
Because the justices have criticized the Lemon test as vague and
ambiguous, and have argued that Lemon promotes ad hoc decision-
making,97 several of the Court's recent decisions have suggested that a
majority of the justices have abandoned Lemon as the test du jour.98
However, instead of explicitly overruling Lemon, the Court appears
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice Kennedy joined the anti-Lemon
forces and became an advocate and supporter of the coercion analysis. Id. at 659-60 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 6 (1993) (overturning an
appellate court decision relying on Lemon); Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court essentially ignored Lemon in reaching its decision); Southside Fair Housing
Comm. v. New York, 928 F.2d 1336,1344-47 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the Lemon test but expres-
sing doubts as to whether it would continue to be applicable following Lee, then pending
Supreme Court review).
91. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
92. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
93. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14.
94. Id. at 9-10.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 8-10 (highlighting cases in which Establishment Clause challenges were rejected
because the aid flowed through a private citizen, rather than directly to the religious institution).
The Court stated that since the interpreter would only be translating, rather than teaching, there
was little fear that the publicly provided interpreter would import a religious meaning to the
lesson. Id. at 13. Accordingly, no supervision would be necessary and the entanglement prong
would not be implicated. Id.
97. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2019-26 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-400 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); see also William P. Marshall, We Know It
When We See It: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (1986)
(noting that Lemon's ambiguity has caused the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence to be "universally criticized"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 795, 801 (1993) ("[T]he ambiguity of the test left the Court leeway to interpret each
prong in varying ways, producing a bewildering patchwork of decisions.").
98. See supra notes 85-96.
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only to have ignored Lemon in certain Establishment Clause contexts
in favor of several alternative tests, including the coercion test.99
Justice Kennedy has long been an advocate of the coercion test.
According to him, Establishment Clause cases "disclose two limiting
principles: government may not coerce anyone to support or partici-
pate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not ...give direct
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith."1°° Justice Kennedy has further stated:
These two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would
be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of
more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply
substantial benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, di-
rect compulsion to observance, or governmental exhortation to re-
ligiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.10 1
Justice O'Connor, with Justice Kennedy as the decisive swing votes
in religion cases, has also called for replacement or revision of
Lemon. 10 2 In fact, some scholars think the Court already has aban-
doned the test.10 3 With few exceptions, the Court's recent Establish-
ment Clause cases were decided on other theories, without relying on
Lemon.10 4 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, in commenting on a 1993 case,
wrote: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 10 5
2. The Coercion Test
In the wake of this criticism of Lemon, several Justices have advo-
cated the use of an alternative approach: the coercion test.10 6 The
Court recently applied the coercion test in Lee v. Weisman.10 7 In Lee,
the Court held that a high school conducted a formal religious exer-
cise in violation of the Establishment Clause by permitting prayer at a
99. Note that the Lemon test is still used in the context where the government provides aid to
parochial schools. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 1997.
100. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
101. Id. at 659-60.
102. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. See supra note 86.
104. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839-40 (1995) (using the
neutrality test); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993) (using the neu-
trality test); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-94 (1992) (using the psychological coercion test);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989) (using the endorsement test).
105. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107. Id.
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graduation ceremony in a public school. 08 Applying the coercion
test, the Court reasoned that the principal, a state actor, directed a
formal religious exercise.' 0 9 Although the school district did not re-
quire attendance at the ceremony as a condition of graduation, the
Court found attendance was "in a fair and real sense obligatory. '"110
Although the Court agreed that the coercion test should be used,
the justices differed on the terms and type of coercion sufficient to
constitute an Establishment Clause violation. Justice Kennedy, in
writing for the majority, defined coercion in terms of psychological
coercion-peer or social pressure to participate in the religious event:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and con-
trol of high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as
well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or,
at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and bene-
diction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as
any overt compulsion."'
Because peer pressure unacceptably placed "objectors in the dilemma
of participating ... or protesting," the Court held that the prayer vio-
lated the Establishment Clause." 2
Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's psy-
chological coercion test and instead opted for a legal coercion test."13
Justice Scalia had "no quarrel with the Court's general proposition
that the Establishment Clause guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. 1' 4
But he chose to define coercion as legal coercion-"coercion of reli-
gious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of
penalty. ' 115 According to Justice Scalia, the students voluntarily at-
tended graduation and those students who chose not to attend were
not disciplined or penalized." 6 Thus, Justice Scalia would have up-
held the graduation prayer as constitutional.
Yet another view of the coercion test is reflected by comments
made by Justice Black, as early as 1948:
The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or re-
108. Id. at 586-87.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 586, 598.
111. Id. at 593.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 636-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 642 (quoting the majority, id. at 587).
115. Id. at 640; see also id. at 642 (defining legal coercion as threat of penalty).
116. Id. at 637-39.
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main away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs.117
Forty five years later, in Lee, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed Justice
Black's view that if government pressures someone to participate in a
religious activity, that action is an "obvious indication that the govern-
ment is endorsing or promoting religion"'118 regardless of whether it is
psychological or legal coercion."19
As demonstrated above, the Court does not agree on which coer-
cion test it should use: the psychological coercion test posited by Jus-
tice Kennedy, the legal coercion test offered by Justice Scalia, or the
general test presented by Justice Black. As a result, which test shall
be used is simply a function of the composition of the Court's major-
ity. If the majority opinion includes Justice Kennedy, but excludes
Justice Scalia, then most likely the psychological test used in Lee v.
Weisman will be applied. On the other hand, if Justice Scalia rests
with the majority opinion, and Kennedy with the dissent, then the
legal coercion test may be used. Justice Black's version of the test, the
only test which seems to actually reflect the true words of the Estab-
lishment Clause: "neither a state nor the Federal Government can...
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from a
church"120-is broader than both Justice Kennedy's and Justice
Scalia's views. The justices' diverse views regarding the coercion test
mean that it is unclear which constitutional standard will be used by
the Court when it next confronts an Establishment Clause matter.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
MANDATORY TREATMENT CASES
Theism and prayer, two quintessentially religious concepts, are fun-
damental to the A.A. program of recovery. 12 1 The Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is instructive when determining
whether A.A. is a religion. Courts have expressed varying opinions
on the constitutionality of state-mandated A.A. programs. Some
courts view A.A. as a religion and thus any effort by the State to man-
date attendance at the program constitutes an Establishment Clause
117. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
118. Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
121. See infra notes 240-87 and accompanying text.
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violation. 22 Other courts ignore A.A.'s use of traditional Christian
practices and fail to find any such violation. 123
The Supreme Court has not been presented with the issue of
whether a state correctional institution may require an inmate to at-
tend a substance abuse counseling program that is arguably religious
in nature. However, state and federal appellate courts have grappled
with this issue.' 24 When such courts use the Lemon test, mandatory
use of A.A. as a condition of probation has generally been found con-
stitutional. 125 Conversely, courts that use the coercion test generally
conclude that conditioning probation on mandatory participation in
A.A. violates the Establishment Clause.1 26
A. The Lemon Test As Applied to the Mandatory Treatment Cases
The crux of the issue in determining whether a court finds a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause is whether A.A. is a religion.1 27
Some courts have concluded that A.A. practices are not constitution-
ally religious, although they may partake in a blend of secular and
spiritual activities. 128 According to these courts, to be unconstitu-
tional, the petitioner must demonstrate that the primary purpose of
the program is to "compel advancement of constitutionally implicated
religious practices or to stifle agnostic or atheistic preferences. ' 129
In Boyd v. Coughlin,130 a district court in New York dismissed an
inmate's complaint alleging that the alcohol and drug rehabilitation
program in New York prisons, used as a prerequisite for family visita-
tion rights, violated both the Establishment and Free Exercise
122. See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996); Warner v. Orange County Dep't
of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 870 F. Supp. 69, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 115 F.3d 1068, 1074 (2d Cir. 1996); Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478,484
(Tenn. 1997).
123. See Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 834 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Feasel v. Willis, 904 F.
Supp. 582, 585-86 (N.D. Tex. 1995); O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal.
1994); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993);
Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (D. Kan. 1991).
124. See infra Part II.A., for a discussion of cases in which state and federal appellate courts
have found A.A. to be merely spiritual and non-religious in nature; and supra Part II.B., for a
discussion of cases in which state and federal appellate courts have equated A.A. with religion
and found the state requirement of A.A. attendance unconstitutional.
125. See infra notes 127-82 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 183-238 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
128. See Boyd, 914 F. Supp. at 832; Feasel, 904 F. Supp. at 586; O'Connor, 855 F. Supp. at 308;
Jones, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *5; Stafford, 766 F. Supp. at 1017.
129. Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 119 (N.Y. 1996) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
130. Boyd, 914 F. Supp. at 828.
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Clauses. 131 Relying on the Lemon test, the court noted that "the ex-
pressly stated principal and primary goal of the program is the prepa-
ration of chemically dependent inmates for return to the community
and to reduce recidivism.' 132 Although the court contended that
there is no Establishment Clause violation if the state action survives
the Lemon test, the court continued its analysis by explaining that
even if the action fails the test, there still may not be a violation if "the
program is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' ' 33
Under the first prong of the Lemon test, the Boyd court held that
the program was secular because it served to treat inmates with sub-
stance abuse problems, "thereby reducing re-incarceration rates and
helping to reduce the scope and effects of the serious social problem
of alcoholics and drug addicts."'1 34 The program also survived the sec-
ond prong-that the principal or primary purpose of the program
does not advance nor inhibit religion. 35 In making this determina-
tion, the court considered the prison context of the case.136 It noted
that Boyd was an inmate who had an alcohol problem and stressed
that Boyd was not obligated to attend the program. 137 According to
the court, the program was "merely a prerequisite to [Boyd's] partici-
pation in the voluntary [Family Reunion Program]."'1 38 Furthermore,
under the second-prong, the court maintained that the A.A. literature
references to God and a Higher Power did not reflect "any concept of
organized religion, but rather, reflect[ed] a belief that some form of
spirituality is necessary to recovery."'1 39 In reference to the third
prong, the court simply reiterated its notion that Boyd was not com-
pelled to participate in the treatment program.' 40
Similarly, in Stafford v. Harrison,'4' a district court in Kansas up-
held a mandated treatment program for prisoners that incorporated
131. Id. at 834.
132. Id. at 833.
133. Id. at 832.
134. Id.
135. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
136. Boyd, 914 F. Supp. at 832.
137. Id. at 833.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991). Stafford filed a civil rights complaint while he was an
inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections for an assault conviction. Id. at 1015. He
alleged his constitutional rights were violated while he was a resident of the Larned State Secur-
ity Hospital. Id. He specifically claimed that his free exercise right was violated when he was
required to complete the alcohol rehabilitation program prior to his release from confinement.
Id. Stafford had a long history of alcohol use. Id. Prior to his assault conviction, he had numer-
ous traffic violations and two convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. While in
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principles of A.A. The court found that the treatment program was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and was, there-
fore, acceptable form of prison management. 142 The Stafford court,
like the Boyd court, embarked on an extensive analysis of the spiritual
principles of A.A. and found that the A.A. program defined no single
image or exclusive concept of a "Higher Power."'1 43 The court con-
cluded by stating:
[W]hile the expression of the philosophy of Alcoholics Anonymous
includes references to a Higher Power, this court cannot on that ba-
sis alone reasonably conclude either that Alcoholics Anonymous
constitutes a religion or that a religion was impermissibly thrust
upon plaintiff during his incarceration. The court therefore rejects
plaintiff's assertions that the state improperly established a religion
and that the defendants imposed a religion on him. 144
This refusal to characterize A.A. as a religious organization has also
been followed by other courts.145 In Feasel v. Willis,146 a district court
in Texas held that mandated A.A. meetings for prisoners did not vio-
late a clearly established right nor did it amount to forced indoctrina-
tion of religion.' 47 Likewise, in Jones v. Smid,148 the petitioner, an
atheistic inmate, failed to meet the burden of proof that A.A. coerced
him to express a belief in God.149 Like many courts, the Jones court
found A.A. to be spiritual but not religious.150
Alcoholics Anonymous treatment has also been used as a probation
condition for drunk driving offenses. In O'Connor v. California,'5'
O'Connor was convicted of driving under the influence. 152 As part of
his probation terms, the court ordered him to enroll in the county's
the state penitentiary, Stafford was admitted to Larned Hospital for inpatient alcohol treatment
with the Chemical Dependency Recovery Program. Id. The program was designed to provide
services for inmates who required treatment for abuse of alcohol or "mood-altering" chemicals
prior to consideration for parole. Id. The treatment program incorporated information on the
principles of both A.A. and N.A. Id. Stafford was removed from the program, without satisfac-
tory completion, because of his low motivation within the program. Id. As a result, the Kansas
Parole Board denied Stafford consideration for parole and again recommended a treatment pro-
gram for alcohol and drug abuse. Id. at 1016.
142. Id. at 1017.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Feasel v. Willis, 904 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-
20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993).
146. 904 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
147. Id. at 586.
148. No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *8.
149. Id. at *9.
150. Id. at *4.
151. 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
152. Id. at 304.
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alcohol and drug education program administered by the National
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence. 153 The Council's pro-
gram advised O'Connor that, in addition to its meetings, O'Connor
must attend weekly self-help meetings from a list of approved provid-
ers. 154 The approved list included A.A. and two non-sectarian organi-
zations. 155 O'Connor alleged that the endorsement and promotion of
A.A. by the State through its approval of county alcohol programs
violated the Establishment Clause.156
Applying the Lemon test, the court concluded that California did
not violate the Establishment Clause. Similar to Boyd, Stafford,
Feasel and Jones, the O'Connor court first reasoned that the "principal
and primary effect of encouraging participation in A.A. is not to ad-
vance religious belief but to treat substance abuse."'1 57 The court ad-
mitted that spirituality is a central part of the A.A. philosophy and
that the program contains religious overtones. 158 Nonetheless, the
court determined A.A. was not a religion because various individual
faiths may participate without renouncing their specific religious con-
victions. 159 The court further substantiated its holding by reasoning
that the A.A. program was one of a variety of options available to the
convicted driver, not the only program that would satisfy the condi-
tion of probation. 60 According to the court, had O'Connor not
wanted to attend A.A., he could have devised his own means of self-
help and sought approval from the county.16' Finally, the court con-
153. Id.
154. Id. Section 9860, title IX of the California Code of Regulations permits individual coun-
ties to mandate "additional program" requirements to the treatment, as long as the counties
"ensure that a variety of options areavailable which take into account the unique needs of each
participant." Id. at 305 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETv CODE § 11837.4 (West 1991) (requiring
that any such "additional program" requirements be specifically approved by the state, and the
state must monitor these additional programs)). The purpose of allowing counties to mandate
"additional programs" provides communities with control over community-type services that
focus on the result of alcohol use or abuse. Id.
155. Id. According to the county, it is up to the individual to find a complying program. Id.
Alcoholics Anonymous and Rational Recovery, a non-sectarian organization, are pre-approved
programs; however, an individual may participate in any other non-religious programs approved
by the county. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 307.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 308. Other courts have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d
894, 898-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that it was not a violation of a drunk driver's constitu-
tional rights to require him to participate in an A.A. program, because the primary purpose of
the group was to treat alcoholism, and because participation in only that group was not
mandatory).
161. O'Connor, 855 F. Supp. at 308.
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tended that there existed a lack of entanglement-the third prong of
the Lemon test-between the State and A.A.162 Evidence indicated
that A.A. "does not receive any money, materials, or administrative
input from religious groups or institutions, nor does it receive any
money from the State or County in exchange for accepting those con-
victed of drunk driving."'1 63 The only involvement between the State
and A.A., according to the court, was that the individual must fulfill
the self-help requirement and that A.A. is a recommended means of
doing so. 164
The five cases illustrated above use similar reasoning in holding that
state-mandated A.A. programs are constitutional. While each court
admitted that A.A. has religious and/or spiritual undertones, each
court relied on the Lemon test to find no First Amendment violation.
Accordingly, each court first reasoned that the primary purpose of
A.A. is to treat the alcoholic's addiction, not to proselytize religion.
Second, the courts declared A.A. neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion because A.A. does not support any particular faith. Finally, the
courts placed a strong emphasis on the element of choice. The State
did not excessively entangled itself with A.A. if the participants could
choose whether to attend A.A. meetings.
Sometimes the Lemon test has been used to the prisoner's advan-
tage. In Griffin v. Coughlin,165 the Court of Appeals of New York
used the second prong of the test to reject a prison rehabilitation pro-
gram because, as the court held, such a program was religious, and
forced attendance constituted a state endorsement of religion. 66 Grif-
fin, an atheist and heroin addict, was an inmate at Shawangunk Cor-
rectional Facility in New York.167 At the prison, he was eligible for
the Family Reunion Program, but in order to receive that benefit he
had to participate in the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment
(ASAT) program. 68 In his grievance, Griffin conceded that he was
not being forced to attend the ASAT program, but that his participa-
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
166. Id. at 107-08.
167. Id. at 100.
168. Id. at 106. The ASAT-Family Reunion program is provided pursuant to NEW YORK
COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES, & REGULATIONS tit. 7, §§ 220.2(a)(3)(ii), 220.8 (1995). The
Family Reunion Program grants some inmates the opportunity to receive selected visitors for
extended time periods. Id. § 220.1. Eligibility is dependent on satisfying specified criteria, in-
cluding a minimum length of stay at a correctional facility and a clean disciplinary record. Id.
§ 220.2(a)-(b). A relevant feature in this case is attendance by inmates at therapeutic treatment
programs related to their particular offenses or overall histories. Id. § 220.2(a)(3)(ii). Inmates
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tion in the program was a precondition to receiving privileges under
the family reunion plan.' 69 The court held that the Establishment
Clause does not permit the State to deprive an atheistic or agnostic
inmate of eligibility for an expanded family visitation program be-
cause of the inmate's refusal to participate in the prison's sole alcohol
and drug rehabilitation program. 170 The court reasoned that the
Twelve Steps of A.A. amounted to a religious exercise as a matter of
law, and that "adherence to the A.A. fellowship entail[ed] engage-
ment in religious activity and religious proselytization.' 71 The court
discussed in detail how the "A.A. basic literature most reasonably
would be characterized as reflecting the traditional elements common
to most theistic religions."'1 72 Throughout the opinion, the majority
emphasized how five of the Twelve Steps, as well as the fundamental
teachings of A.A., referred to God.173
In making its decision, the court of appeals held that the State vio-
lated the Establishment Clause by not remaining neutral with respect
to religion 174 and by compelling the petitioner to attend and partici-
pate in A.A. meetings.' 75 First, the court relied on the second prong
of the Lemon test, the endorsement prong, to determine that A.A. has
the primary effect of promoting religion. 176 According to the court, "a
fair reading of the fundamental A.A. doctrinal writings discloses that
their dominant theme is unequivocally religious ... [and manifests]
faithful devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity."'1 77
Once the court demonstrated that A.A. tenets and practices entail
religious exercise, the court declared that the ASAT Program violated
the Establishment Clause because it compelled attendance by the in-
mates.178 The court stressed: "There is no firmer or more settled prin-
ciple of Establishment Clause jurisprudence than that prohibiting the
use of the State's power to force one to profess a religious belief or
participate in a religious activity."'1 79 Thus, the court concluded that
the Shawangunk Correctional Facility may not require an inmate, "to
with prior drug history are required to participate in ASAT in order to participate in the Family
Reunion Program. Id. §§ 220.2(a)(3)(ii), 220.8.
169. Griffin, 673 N.E.2d at 102.
170. Id. at 106.
171. Id. at 103.
172. Id. at 102.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 107-08.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 105.
179. Id.
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forfeit his . . . benefits [e.g., eligibility for the Family Reunion Pro-
gram] as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored reli-
gious practice."'1 80 In dicta, the majority conceded the proven
effectiveness of A.A. to rehabilitate drug and alcohol addiction, and
suggested that the State could continue the program if it were contin-
ued on a voluntary, rather than forced, basis.181 The court suggested
that the program may be saved if the inmate has a choice of another,
nonreligious treatment alternative. 182
B. The Coercion Test as Applied in the Mandatory Treatment Cases
Most courts that have applied the Lemon test have unequivocally
held that the State has not violated the Establishment Clause. 183
More recently, as courts have started to abandon Lemon in favor of
the coercion test, the contrary result has been achieved in virtually the
same factual circumstances. 184
The Second Circuit used the coercion test to strike down mandatory
participation in A.A. as a probation requirement for driving under the
influence of mind altering substances offenses. 185 In Warner v. Orange
County Department of Probation86 the court held that the state re-
quired the probationer to become associated with a particular reli-
gious ideology. 187 Warner was convicted of driving while under the
influence of alcohol and was given probation rather than imprison-
ment. 88 The probation required that Warner attend A.A.189 Warner,
an atheist, objected to the condition on the ground that mandatory
attendance at A.A. meetings violated his right to free exercise of reli-
gion and violated the Establishment Clause. 190
The district court held, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, that Warner's complaint adequately alleged a violation of
constitutional rights. 191 First, the court found that atheism fell within
180. Id. at 106 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
181. Id. at 99.
182. Id.; see, e.g., O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that
the requirement of attending A.A. for DUI probation was not a violation of the establishment
clause because A.A. was only one of a few treatment program options).
183. See supra notes 128-64 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Sections H.A.-B. for a discussion on the Lemon and coercion tests.
185. See Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
affd, 870 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 115 F.3d 1068 (2nd Cir. 1996).
186. Id.
187. Warner, 115 F.3d at 1074-75.
188. Warner, 870 F. Supp. at 70.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Warner, 870 F. Supp. at 72-73, affd, 115 F.3d at 1074-77.
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First Amendment protection because the "government may not com-
pel affirmation of religious belief,"and atheism was the antitheses of
religious belief.192 Second, the court held that the condition was obli-
gatory since Warner could have rejected the A.A. treatment for reli-
gious reasons, but only at the potential risk of incarceration. 193
Finally, the court held that despite the fact that required attendance
serves the secular purpose of rehabilitation, A.A. has the primary ef-
fect of advancing religion.1 94 The Second Circuit further noted that
there was no doubt that Warner was coerced into participating in
A.A.'s religious exercises by virtue of his probation sentence. 195 Ac-
cording to the court, neither the probation recommendation nor the
court's sentence offered Warner a choice among other, non-sectarian
therapy programs. 196 It was "the coercive circumstance, conditioning
a desirable privilege on the prisoner's participation in a religious pro-
gram, without alternative" that enabled the court to find a violation of
the Establishment Clause. 197
Similarly, a prisoner in Tennessee brought a claim against the state's
prison board for requiring him to participate in an A.A. treatment
program in order to receive parole.198 Prisoner Anthony Evans con-
tended that A.A. is religious and, thus, required participation in it vio-
lates the Establishment Clause. 199 In his petition, Evans stated:
[T]here is only one "alcohol program" available... and he is being
coerced to participate in that program, as a condition of parole....
The "alcohol program" is administered by the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Correction (TDOC), but the requirement [that] he con-
tinue [to] participate in the program as a condition of parole
originates with the Board of Paroles .... The centerpiece of the
program ... is the twelve (12) steps of Alcoholics Anonymous....
The concept of a higher power is at the center of the twelve (12)
steps. The twelve (12) steps explicitly deny that recovery from alco-
holism is possible without reliance on a higher power. The empha-
sis a higher power is also . . . entitled "Alcoholics Anonymous"
which is used as an all-purpose guide for anyone having difficulty in
working the twelve (12) steps. Group prayer is common at the
meetings... [and] meetings open with the "Serenity Prayer," essen-
192. Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 265 (quoting Employ-
ment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 266-67.
195. Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. 1997). While this case has
two petitioners, Jimmy Arnold and Anthony Evans, only Evans' claim opposed forced participa-
tion in the A.A. treatment program. Id. at 480.
199. Id. at 483.
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tially non-denominational [sic], and close with "The Lord's
Prayer," a Christian prayer.200
The Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged the United States
Supreme Court's difficulty in determining whether a certain policy or
practice favors or establishes a religion.20 1 The Tennessee court also
recognized that there is no debate, however, that a government policy
that requires participation in a religious activity violates the Establish-
ment Clause: "It [is] 'beyond dispute' that the Constitution guarantees
that the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise. '20 2
Evans had requested prospective injunctive relief by the trial court
to ensure that future parole decisions would not consider an inmate's
participation in the A.A. program. 20 3 The Tennessee Supreme Court
held that the board illegally denied Evans parole and, thus, granted
Evans his claim to relief.20 4 The supreme court stated that if the trial
court finds that the A.A. program is a religious one, and if there are
no secular alternative treatment programs offered, then the trial court
must hold that to require a prisoner to attend such programs would
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. 20 5 The supreme
court further noted that attending or failing to attend a state-sup-
ported religious meeting cannot be considered in deciding whether to
grant or deny parole. 206
While most of the cases have involved the rehabilitation of al-
cholics, the coercion test has also been used to strike down state use of
a self-help rehabilitation program, based on Narcotics Anonymous
(N.A.), for drug addicts as a requirement for early parole. The Sev-
enth Circuit, in Kerr v. Farrey,20 7 while not totally disavowing use of
the Lemon test, held that the State impermissibly coerced inmates to
participate in a religious program by forcing the inmates to attend
N.A. 20 8 The court never applied the Lemon test, and only mentioned
its use in cases where the Supreme Court has struck down statutes
providing financial assistance to religions. 20 9 James Kerr, an inmate at
200. Id.
201. Id. at 484.
202. Id. (citing Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996)).
203. Id.
204. Id. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Evans' petition and
remanded it back to the trial court. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
208. Id. at 474.
209. Id. at 479.
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the Oakhill Correctional Institution in Oregon, Wisconsin, 210 was re-
quired to attend N.A. meetings to combat his chemical dependency. 211
Oakhill chose to use N.A., the only substance abuse program available
to inmates, because it had demonstrated success with inmates and the
program was free for both the institution and the prisoners.212 Ac-
cording to Kerr, resisting the program would negatively impact his
early parole eligibility.213
Narcotics Anonymous, like A.A., follows a twelve-step program.214
At the first meeting, Kerr objected to the use of God's name in "this
messy business of addictions, ' 215 and asserted that the program's use
of God was in conflict with his own belief of free will.216 The district
court, however, was not convinced by Kerr's assertion that N.A. was
closely aligned with religion. The court accepted the defendant's posi-
tion that the higher being concept in N.A. "could range from a reli-
gious view of God to the non-religious [sic] concept of individual
willpower. '21 7 In making its decision, the district court relied on both
the Lemon test and a balancing of penological interests versus per-
sonal interests.218 Under the penological balancing test, a prison pol-
icy that impinges on an inmate's First Amendment rights would be
valid if it was "reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests. ' 219 Therefore, if the state action was found to have established
religion under the Lemon test, the program may still be found consti-
tutional if the penological interest was a legitimate state action.220
Under the three-pronged Lemon test, the district court concluded that
the N.A. program had a secular purpose that neither advanced nor
210. Id.
211. Id. Oakhill N.A. meetings always began with a prayer invoking the Lord and the partici-
pants were encouraged to read the N.A. book which contained many references to God and
spirituality. Id, at 475.
212. Id. at 474.
213. Id. Kerr asserted in an affidavit that he objected immediately to the program. Id. His
affidavit claimed that he was told by Alan Webb, the prison social worker assigned to his case,
that he "didn't have a choice in the matter; that attendance was mandatory; that if [he] didn't go,
[he] would most likely be shipped off to a medium (i.e., higher security) prison, and denied the
hope of parole." Id. at 475.
214. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
215. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 475.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 479. The district court relied on Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), in which the
Court allowed an infringement of an inmate's rights relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-
inmate correspondences. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479.
219. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 475.
220. Id; see also infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
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inhibited religion, and that there was no state entanglement in the
form of economic support.221
The Seventh Circuit, in overruling the district court, noted that the
Supreme Court has wrestled with Establishment Clause principles in
primarily two contexts. According to the Seventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court has first decided cases that deal with government ef-
forts to coerce or force a person to support or participate in religion or
its exercise. 222 Second, says the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court
has been confronted with cases in which an existing religious group
seeks some benefit from the State, or in which the State wishes to
confer a benefit on such a group.223 Under the first line of cases, the
Seventh Circuit noted: "[A]lthough our precedents make clear that
proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establish-
ment Clause violation, it is sufficient. '224 Government pressure to
participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the gov-
ernment is endorsing or promoting religion.225 The Kerr court, in de-
ciphering the Supreme Court's reasoning, stated:
Individuals may disagree in a particular case over other issues, such
as whether it is the state who has acted, or whether coercion is pres-
ent, or whether religion or something else is the aim of the coercion.
But in general, a coercion-based claim indisputably raises an Estab-
lishment Clause question.226
The Seventh Circuit noted that the second line of cases, according to
the Supreme Court, is one for which the Lemon test was designed. 227
These involve cases in which the State has taken steps to help existing
institutions that establish a religion or tend to do so. 228
The appellate court found that Kerr's case was more analogous to
the first line of coercion cases because Kerr was coerced by the prison,
an agent of the State of Wisconsin, to attend religious meetings under
threat of penalties.229 The court, in an effort to provide a distinct test
to reflect the Supreme Court's division of two types of Establishment
Clause cases, noted three points that are crucial in determining a vio-
lation through coercion. First, the State must have done an affirma-
tive act; second, the action must amount to coercion; and third, the
221. Id.
222. Id. at 477.
223. Id. at 477-78.
224. Id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1991)).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Kerr analogized his forced participation in N.A. to forced "attendance of service at a
Mosque, a Jewish Temple, or a meeting of Pentecostals [sic]." Id. (correction in original text).
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object of the coercion must be religious and not secular.230 The court
held that all three criteria were met.231 First, the State of Wisconsin,
through prison authorities, initiated the program; the fact that N.A.
actually operated the treatment program was of no consequence be-
cause the prison officials required the inmates to attend the meet-
ings.232 Second, required attendance at N.A. meetings constituted
coercion because an inmate who refused was subject to penalties. 233
Lastly, the court found that the defendant's description of N.A. as a
"non-religious (sic) idea of willpower within the individual" 234 was in-
correct, and that the program was religious. According to the court, a
"straightforward reading of the [T]welve [S]teps shows clearly that the
steps are based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme
Being. '235 Because all three criteria were met, the court held that the
program ran afoul of the prohibition of a state favoring religion over
non-religion. 236
These cases demonstrate a change in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. Instead of using the Lemon test, these courts recognized the
test's limitations and applied the coercion test. Each court conceded
that defining religion is a difficult task; yet, all three courts found A.A.
proselytizes religious concepts. The courts relied heavily on the very
words in Alchoholics Anonymous to reach these conclusions. 237 Fur-
thermore, the courts substantiated the holdings by indicating that the
lack of choice between secular and sectarian programs played a part in
the decisions.238 Existence of a choice may have helped the program
survive constitutional challenge.
III. ANALYSIS
Compulsory participation in Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition
of early parole or family visitation presents a conflict between individ-
ual rights under the First Amendment and state initiatives to produce
safe prison environments. Generally, the rehabilitation of substance
abuse inmates is a wise policy, and state-offered rehabilitation pro-
grams do not necessarily infringe constitutional rights. Constitutional
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 480.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See infra note 247 and accompanying text (specifically, steps 3, 5, 6, 7 and 11).
238. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir.
1996).
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questions arise, however, when the state compels participation at
A.A., an arguably religious, admittedly spiritual, organization.2 39
This section maintains that A.A. is, indeed, a religious organization.
Furthermore, this section demonstrates how A.A. supporters, as well
as supporters of the infamous Lemon test, attempt to hide behind the
veil of defining A.A.'s religious intentions as merely spiritual. This
section further explains that requiring participation in A.A. by prison-
ers is a state action that unduly coerces them to participate in a state-
sponsored, religious activity. In supporting the reactivation of the co-
ercion test, this section denounces the Lemon test and demonstrates
why, using the coercion analysis, prisoners with drug and alcohol
problems are being deprived the protection of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause when they do not participate.
A. The Immaculate Conception of Alcoholics Anonymous and Its
Adherence to God
Alcoholics Anonymous has over 95,000 chapters worldwide with
approximately 2 million members. 240 It is the leading self-help, reha-
bilitative organization for alcoholics.24' The book Alcoholics Anony-
mous 242 is the central text of A.A. and is often referred to as the
"Bible" by A.A. members.2 43 Although the forward to Alcoholics
Anonymous states that A.A. is "not allied with any particular faith,
sect or denomination, 1244 the founders of A.A., Bill Wilson and Dr.
Robert Smith, were greatly influenced by the religious doctrines of the
Oxford Group, an evangelical Christian group,2 45 established on mon-
otheistic principles. 246
Alcoholics Anonymous bases its treatment on twelve intervals
called the "Twelve Steps" and governs its organization on twelve rules
239. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, infra note 247, at 569-72. Some regard A.A. as "[using] reli-
gious principles . . .although [the organization is] not religious in nature." TREATMENT AND
PREVENTION, infra note 243, at 173.
240. As of January, 1997, A.A. has 50,671 groups and 1,153,795 members in the United States
and almost 2 million members worldwide. Alcoholics Anonymous, <http://www.alcoholics-
anonymous.org/factfile/doc.7html>.
241. See CHARLES Q. BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? 9 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter CULT OR CURE?]
242. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, infra note 247, at xiv. Participants in A.A. frequently
refer to this book as their "Bible" or the "Big Book."
243. See Richard W. Thoreson & Frank C. Budd, Self-Help Groups and Other Group Proce-
dures for Treating Alcohol Problems, in TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF ALCOHOL PROBLEMS:
A RESOURCE MANUAL 157, 171 (1987) [hereinafter TREATMENT AND PREVENTION].
244. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, infra note 247, at xiv.
245. See CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 62.
246. Id. at 62-63.
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called the "Twelve Traditions. ' 247 The Twelve Steps and Twelve Tra-
ditions appearing in Alcoholics Anonymous illustrate the significance
247. The Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous are as follows:
1. We admit we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had become
unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we
understood Him.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of
our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to
them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so
would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admit-
ted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God
as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the
power to carry that out.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this
message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs.
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 59-60 (3d ed.
1976) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS]. The Twelve Traditions are as follows:
1. Our common welfare should come first; personal recovery depends upon A.A.
unity.
2. For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority-a loving God as He
may express Himself in our group conscience. Our leaders are but trusted ser-
vants; they do not govern.
3. The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop drinking.
4. Each group should be autonomous except in matters affecting other groups or
A.A. as a whole.
5. Each group has but one primary purpose-to carry its message to the alcoholic
who still suffers.
6. An A.A. group ought never endorse, finance, or lend the A.A. name to any re-
lated facility or outside enterprise, lest problems of money, property and prestige
divert us from our primary purpose.
7. Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining outside
contributions.
8. Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever nonprofessional, but our service
centers may employ special workers.
9. Alcoholics Anonymous, as such, ought never be organized; but we may create
service boards or committees directly responsible to those they serve.
10. Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the A.A. name
ought never be drawn into public controversy.
11. Our public relations policy is based on attraction rather than promotion; we need
always maintain personal anonymity at the level of press, radio, television and
films.
12. Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our Traditions, ever reminding us to
place principles before personalities.
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of religious principles to the A.A. program of recovery. 248 For exam-
ple, the second of the Twelve Traditions states: "For our group pur-
pose there is but one ultimate authority-a loving 'God' as 'He' may
express 'Himself' in our group conscience. '249 The TWelve Steps, in
turn, represent the cornerstone of the A.A. program of recovery and
the center of every participant's life. In order to be a fully recovered
alcoholic, the participant must take each step as truth and must suc-
cessfully accomplish each one.250
B. The Religious Component of Alcoholics Anonymous
While the "primary objective of A.A. is to enable its adherents to
achieve sobriety, its doctrine unmistakably urges that the path whole-
heartedly embraces traditional theistic beliefs."'251 Alcoholics Anony-
mous' twelve-step program plays a major role in treatment for addicts.
Nonetheless, the preliminary debate among judicial scholars who
question the implication of state compelled A.A. participation upon
constitutional rights involves "whether A.A. should be characterized
as religious or ... religion-neutral. '252 Experts in the recovery field
have viewed A.A. as a community support system, a social movement,
therapy, a way of life, a religious movement, and even a cult. 253
Alcoholics Anonymous is properly considered a religion for three
reasons. First, the founders modeled A.A. after a religious organiza-
tion, the Oxford Group Movement, and A.A. continues to follow the
theistic principles of the Movement. Second, the Twelve Steps and
Twelve Traditions, the foundation principles of A.A., refer to God and
contain other religious connotations. Third, the A.A. members incor-
porate religious prayer into the meetings and accept God as their sav-
ior from the depths of alcoholism.
Alcoholics Anonymous attributes its foundation to three belief sys-
tems: (1) the concept of surrendering powerless to a being greater
than human; (2) the belief that spiritual needs require a spiritual expe-
Id. at 564; see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE
TRADITIONS 129-89 (1981) [hereinafter TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS] (examining
the meaning and nature of the TWelve Traditions in depth).
248. See supra note 247.
249. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 247, at 564.
250. CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, 59-60.
251. Griffin v. Coushlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1996).
252. Christopher K. Smith, State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First Amendment and
Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
299, 302 (1992).
253. TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 243, at 164 (citing a 1979 study by Gartner &
Reisman); see also CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 82-102 (discussing the similarities and
differences between A.A. and "cults").
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rience in order to achieve a successful change in one's self; and (3) the
tenets of the Oxford Group Movement.25 4 William (Bill) Griffith Wil-
son and Dr. Robert Smith, devoted followers of the Oxford Group
Movement, were the co-founders and driving force behind A.A.2 55
The Oxford Group Movement began around 1908 and stemmed from
the ideas preached by the Evangelical Lutheran, Frank Buchman.2 56
The Movement was a religious revivalist organization that mandated
the confession of bad acts and the recognition of the need for change,
with the desired result of direct access to God.257 In the beginning,
A.A. was closely aligned with Buchman's Movement.25 8 Following his
own "spiritual awakening," Wilson encouraged other alcoholics to
practice the Oxford principles of admission of fault and seeking recov-
ery and retribution though God in order for them to also reach sobri-
ety.2 59 Early A.A. members attended Oxford Group meetings; in fact,
Dr. Smith referred to the group as "the alcoholic squadron of the Ak-
ron Oxford Group. '260 In 1937, due to differences with the Oxford
Group,261 the fledgling A.A. severed its formal connections with the
Movement.2 62 While A.A. physically removed itself from the Move-
ment, the religious tenets of the Oxford Group remained at the heart
of A.A. Demonstration of this connection is that each of the Twelve
254. TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 243, at 164; see also CULT OR CURE?, supra
note 241, at 35-37 (explaining the conception of A.A.).
255. See CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 34-38.
256. Id. at 16.
257. See TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 243, at 165; see also CULT OR CURE?,
supra note 241, at 35-37 (recounting the beginnings of A.A.).
258. See CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 36-39.
259. See id. Wilson's experience with sobriety began with the following statement:
I found myself crying out, "If there is a God, let Him show Himself! I am ready to do
anything, anything!"
"Suddenly the room lit up with a great white light.... All about me ... there was a
wonderful feeling of Presence, and I thought to myself, 'So this is the God of the
preachers."'
WILLIAM WILSON, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE 63 (1985).
260. See CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 38. The Akron Group, located in Akron, Ohio,
was a chapter of the Oxford Movement. Id.
261. Although Wilson maintained faith in the principles of the Oxford Group Movement, he
believed alcoholics needed to be fed the ideas "with teaspoons rather than buckets." Id. at 39
(quoting WILSON, supra note 259, at 75). Alcoholics Anonymous founders also worried that a
close link with the Buchmanites, those who followed the Oxford Group, might alienate the Cath-
olic church and Catholic alcoholics. See CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 39. Additionally, in
1936, Frank Buchman, founder of the Oxford Group, expressed controversial views approving of
Adolf Hitler, providing good reasons for A.A. to distance itself from the Oxford Group move-
ment. See id. at 23-26 (discussing Buchman's 1936 interview where he "thank[ed] heaven for a
man like Adolf Hitler, who built a front line of defense against the anti-Christ of Communism").
262. CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 39.
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Steps and Twelve Traditions of A.A. is traceable to the teachings of
Frank Buchman.263
The literature and founding principles of A.A. further demonstrate
its religious approach to alcohol recovery.2 64 The nucleus of the A.A.
program is the Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions approach.2 65 Six
out of twelve steps refer to the monotheistic God, a higher power or
prayer. In fact, the word 'God' appears 132 times in Alchoholics
Anonymous, and pronouns for God, such as 'Him' and 'He', are men-
tioned eighty times.2 66 Under the Twelve Steps, step one requires the
A.A. member to admit powerlessness over alcohol; step two to recog-
nize that only a "Power greater than ourselves could restore us to san-
ity."'2 67 By step three, one has "[m]ade a decision to turn [his or her]
will and [his or her life] over to the care of God .... ",268 At step six,
one is "entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of charac-
ter;" and at step seven, the alcoholic "[h]umbly ask[s] Him to remove
[his or her] shortcomings. 2 69 Under the second tradition of the
Twelve Traditions, the member believes, "[T]here is but one ultimate
authority-a loving God as He may express Himself. 270
In addition to A.A.'s religious foundation and principles, group
prayer is commonplace at A.A. meetings. Members frequently com-
mence A.A. meetings with a recitation of the Serenity Prayer and usu-
ally end the meetings by joining hands and reciting the Lord's
Prayer.27' These two prayers are distinct to Western religions, primar-
ily Christianity,272 and may often be heard out of the mouths of
church congregations.
263. Id. at 41. Charles Bufe observes that the TWelve Steps have remained unchanged
through over the 50 years of A.A. growth and "probably not one member in 100 of A.A.... has
more than the foggiest concept of where the ... program originated." Id. at 52-53.
264. See generally ALCOCHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 247.
265. Id. at 62-81 (discussing the religious nature of the twelve steps and traditions).
266. See STEWART C., A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE Bio BOOK OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
115 (1986).
267. See ALCOCHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 247, at 59.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 247, at 132.
271. Id.
272. See TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 243, at 166; see also Warner v. Orange
County Dep't of Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that A.A. meetings that
the plaintiff attended opened with the Serenity Prayer and closed with the Lord's Prayer).
The Lord's Prayer, commonly referred to as the Our Father, reads:
Our Father who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come, Thy will be
done, On earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread; And forgive us our
debts, As we also have forgiven our debtors; And lead us not into temptation, But
deliver us from evil ....
Matthew 6:09-13.
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The New York Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Coughlin273 per-
formed an in-depth analysis of A.A. and its connection to religious
philosophies. 274 After a comprehensive examination of A.A., its liter-
ature and tenants, the court stated:
Concededly, there are passages in A.A. literature . . . which ...
eschew any intent to impose a particular sectarian set of beliefs or a
particular concept of God upon participants. However, a fair read-
ing of the fundamental A.A. doctrinal writings discloses that their
dominant theme is unequivocally religious, certainly in the broad
definitional sense as "manifesting faithful devotion to an acknowl-
edged ultimate reality or deity." Indeed, the A.A. basic literature
most reasonably would be characterized as reflecting the traditional
elements common to most theistic religions. Thus, God is named or
referred to in five of the 12 steps. "Working" the 12 steps includes
confessing to God the "nature of our wrongs" (Step 5), appealing to
God "to remove our shortcomings" (Step 7) and seeking "through
prayer and meditation" to make "contact" with God and achieve
"knowledge of His Will" (Step 11). The 12 Traditions include a pro-
fession of belief that "there is one ultimate authority-a loving God
as He may express Himself in our group conscience."
While A.A. literature declares an openness and tolerance for
each participant's personal vision of God ("as we understood Him"
[Steps 3 and 11]), the writings demonstrably express an aspiration
that each member of the movement will ultimately commit to a be-
lief in the existence of a Supreme Being of independent higher real-
ity than humankind.
[An analysis of Alchoholics Anonymous and the Twelve Steps and
Twelve Traditions texts] demonstrates beyond peradventure that
doctrinally and as actually practiced in the 12-step methodology, ad-
herence to the AA fellowship entails engagement in religious activ-
ity and religious proselytization. Followers are urged to accept the
existence of God as a Supreme Being, Creator, Father of Light and
Spirit of the Universe. In "working" the 12 steps, participants be-
come actively involved in seeking such a God through prayer, con-
fessing wrongs and asking for removal of shortcomings. These
expressions and practices constitute, as a matter of law, religious
exercise for Establishment Clause purposes.275
Members of A.A. attempt to nullify any connection to religion by
characterizing the organization as spiritual without any religious affili-
The Serenity Prayer states: "Lord grant me the serenity to accept the things that I cannot
change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference." Warner
v. Orange County Dept. of Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
273. 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
274. Id. at 101-08.
275. Id. at 102-03 (citations omitted).
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ation.276 However, something does not become a truth simply be-
cause someone says it is held as such. Just because members of A.A.
say the program is not religious does not mean the program does not
proselytize religious beliefs.277 Accordingly, courts, when determining
whether the program is religious, "must examine the nature of the
organization in practice and as administered, not merely defer to self-
definition. ' 278 Assuming arguendo that the founders of A.A. in-
tended the organization to be spiritual and nontheistic, this intention
has not been supported by the reality of the organization. Recital of
religious prayers at meetings clearly indicates the group's religious in-
tent. Using the words 'God', 'Him', or 'He' in the Twelve Steps, while
purposely capitalizing the G and H further substantiates the reality of
the organization's religious connotations. Nevertheless, even if A.A.
is spiritual and not religious, this semantic distinction is inconsequen-
tial for purposes of the Establishment Clause. Accepting A.A.'s self-
definition as spiritual, rather than religious, would not lead to a differ-
ent result. A.A. purports to preempt religiosity by turning "God as
we underst[and] Him,"2 79 into an awareness of just a power higher
than one's self and a general set of beliefs rather than a belief in a
particular God. However, in light of the definition of religion offered
by Justices Kennedy and Black,280 A.A. clearly fits into the functional
definition of religion. Regardless of whether God is the traditional
Christian, Jewish or other Western religion god, it is a higher power to
which A.A. participants must "turn [their] will and [their] lives
over"281 in order to remove the error of their ways.
B. Spiritual Component of Alcoholics Anonymous
Despite A.A.'s reliance on succumbing to the powers of God in or-
der to lead the alcoholic to the path of sobriety, its members deny the
276. Id. at 101.
277. The Attorney General of South Dakota termed A.A. a religious society for tax purposes.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-4-9 (Michie 1996). Additionally, a Wisconsin court relied on A.A.
literature and expert witnesses to reach the conclusion that religious activities were a part of
A.A.'s treatment and that there was no merit in A.A.'s attempt to distinguish between spiritual-
ity and religion. CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 92 (citing Granberg v. Ashland County, 590
F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 1984)).
278. Christopher K. Smith, Note, State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First Amendment
and Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 299, 304 n.51 (1992) (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975)).
279. ALCOCHOLIcs ANONYMOUS, supra note 247, at 59.
280. See supra notes 98-99, 110-111, 115 and accompanying text.
281. ALCOCHOLIcs ANONYMOUS, supra note 247, at 59.
[Vol. 47:565
1998] CORRECTION THROUGH COERCION 601
religious nature of the program.2 82 Members of A.A. assert that the
key to recovery is "an unsuspected inner resource," viewed as "a
Power greater than themselves. '283 They profess that the Power is
spiritual and not religious.284
Admitting powerlessness to a higher being often requires one to
redefine her or his identity. This radical life change is the underlying
goal of A.A., effectuated by the "alteration of major belief sys-
tems. ' 285 As one A.A. member and counselor explained, "A.A. is a
way of life. The notion of surrender, to admit that one is an alcoholic,
begins to redefine who we are. '286 This indoctrinating nature conflicts
with the Establishment Clause because it presents the question of
whether government can compel such a forceful change in beliefs.
State encouragement or establishment of a spiritual organization is
just as violative of the First Amendment Establishment Clause be-
cause it treats religious organizations positively rather than providing
neutral or indifferent treatment. The actual administration of the
A.A. program increases the potential for rights infringement through
both its religious and spiritual elements.287
282. The A.A. "preamble," read at the beginning of each meeting, reinforces that A.A. has no
affiliation with any "particular faith, sect or denomination." See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS,
supra note 247, at xiv. Alcoholics Anonymous representatives term the organization as "spiri-
tual" and only "suggest that you develop a relationship with a higher power." B. Drummond
Ayres Jr., Atheist Challenges Order to Attend A.A. Meetings, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1988, at A12.
283. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 247, at 569-70.
284. Id.
285. See TREATMENT OR PREVENTION, supra note 243, at 164.
286. Ron Gasbarro, Another Road to Recovery: A New Group Offers Alternative to AA,
WASH. POST, May 14, 1991, at D5. Another member's testimonial is as follows:
This is the how and why of [how we stopped our addiction to alcohol]. First of all, we
had to quit playing God. It didn't work. Next, we decided that hereafter in this drama
of life, God was going to be our Director. He is the Principal; we are His agents. He is
the Father, and we are His children. Most good ideas are simple, and this concept was
the keystone of the new and triumphant act through which we passed to freedom.
When we sincerely took such a position, all sorts of remarkable things followed. We
had a new Employer. Being all powerful, He provided what we needed, if we kept
close to Him and performed His work well. Established on such a footing we became
less and less interested in ourselves, our little plans and designs. More and more we
became interested in seeing what we could contribute to life. As we felt new power
flow in, as we enjoyed peace of mind, as we discovered we could face life successfully,
as we became conscious of His presence, we began to lose our fear of today, tomorrow
or the hereafter. We were reborn.
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 247, at 62-63.
287. Not only is the State establishing an indoctrinating program by requiring A.A. participa-
tion, but the State is also infringing on other First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (enacting a free exercise claim
if a government act coerces an individual to violate religious beliefs by "denying any person an
equal share of the rights... enjoyed by other citizens"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 235 (1977) (explaining that a person must be free to reach his or her own beliefs through his
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence finds constitutional violations
when religion is favored over non-religion,288 leading to the assump-
tion that when the government requires someone to recognize a
power greater than oneself, that in itself is religious. Furthermore, an
organization's self-definition should not govern the determination of
the organization's religiousness or spirituality. Courts should investi-
gate the character of the group in its actual, not claimed, activities to
determine its religious nature and be skeptical of First Amendment
violations anytime God becomes a player in a state operation.289
C. Compulsory Participation in A.A. is Unconstitutional
While the State may not establish nor encourage a religion, it also
may not condition a benefit unconstitutionally. The doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions declares that government may not grant a
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.290
In other words, "the government cannot make an individual choose
between receiving a state-conferred benefit and giving up a constitu-
tional right. ' 291 For example, as one commentator has explained:
"[I]ndividuals qualified for unemployment compensation may not be
forced to choose between unemployment benefits and the free exer-
cise of their religion. ' 292 Accordingly, "Once the Court has acknowl-
edged that states cannot do indirectly what they are prohibited from
doing directly, the only issue that remains is whether the burden on
the constitutional right amounts to a violation, and whether it is justi-
fied by the appropriate level of scrutiny. ' 293 Thus, in order to effec-
or her conscience rather than by state coercion); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 223 (1963) (striking down state laws requiring passages from the Bible or the Lord's Prayer
to be read in school).
288. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 757 (1973)
(holding that grants to non-public schools for maintenance and repair violate the Establishment
Clause "because their inevitable effect is to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectar-
ian schools").
289. Courts must examine the nature of the organization in practice and as administered, not
merely defer to self-definition. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 481 (1973).
290. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 10, § 18, at 681 &
n.29 (2d ed. 1988); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Article: Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989) (arguing how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions shifts
the focus from individual entitlements to structural limits on power).
291. Jane Rutherford, The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth: A Power-Based Theory of Unconstitu-
tional Conditions on Religion, 72 DENv. U. L. REV. 909, 909 (1995).
292. Id. Although this paper does not discuss the Free Exercise Clause implications of the
Welfare Act, it is important to note the unconstitutionality of conditioning state benefits on A.A.
293. Id. at 911.
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tively demonstrate the complete gambit of harm a state induces when
it compels A.A. attendance on prisoners, the doctrine must be
addressed.
But the rights of prison inmates are not absolute. They are bal-
anced against the state's penological interests.294 Striking the balance
between the interest of the State in eradicating crime and overpopula-
tion of prisons and the rights of the inmate is a difficult task for any
court, but one which is a fundamental obligation of society.295 The
prohibition on unconstitutional conditions applies to terms of proba-
tion and other privileges. In 1926, the Supreme Court held: "[T]he
state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon
such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in
that respect is not unlimited ... it may not impose conditions which
require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. '296 Therefore, a
condition on a benefit that violates First Amendment protection may
establish the illegality of that condition.297 Prisoners retain constitu-
tional protections even while incarcerated; however, the nature of in-
carceration justifiably limits those protections. 298 Consequently, the
Court applies a lesser standard of scrutiny when determining the con-
stitutionality of prison rules.299
The Supreme Court has formulated a test for determining whether
prison regulations violate inmates' constitutional rights: "[W]hen a
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights the regu-
lation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
est. ''3°° The Court uses a four-part inquiry to determine if the
294. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
295. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[N]ot the least
significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged with crime, particu-
larly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community.").
296. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). But see
West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) ("It was held that those who
take advantage of [the state's] opportunities may not on the ground of conscience refuse compli-
ance with such conditions.").
297. Note that the State is allowed to violate certain rights of the prisoners if the penological
interest is strong. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
298. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
299. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).
300. Id. at 89. In Turner, inmates at the Missouri Division of Corrections challenged two
regulations at the prison. Id. at 81. The first regulation allowed correspondence between in-
mates if it concerns legal matters but only allows other inmate correspondence if each inmate's
classification/treatment team deems it in the best interest of the parties. Id. The second regula-
tion permitted an inmate to marry only with the prison superintendent's permission, which can
be given only when there are "compelling reasons" to do so. Id. at 82. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, held that: rules that regulated inmate-to-inmate correspondence were reason-
ably related to legitimate security concerns of prison officials; but the rule that prohibited in-
mates from marrying other inmates or civilians unless approved by the prison superintendent
19981
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inmate's rights have been violated. Probation and other privileges,
based on conditions that infringe on constitutional rights, may still be
upheld: (1) if there is a valid, rational connection between the condi-
tion and the legitimate government interest put forth to justify it; (2) if
there are no alternative means; (3) if there is no negative effect on the
inmate; and (4) if there are no easy alternatives. 301
Prison officials, working as agents of the state, may interfere with a
prisoner's exercise of First Amendment rights only when such inter-
ference is reasonably related to a legitimate penal interest.30 2 As a
result, "Determining the reasonableness of the interference with a
prisoner's First Amendment right depends not only on the legitimacy
of the penal interest involved, but also on which First Amendment
was not reasonably related to any legitimate penological objectives. Id. at 91-95. The Court
reasoned that correspondence between inmates would allow inmates to develop informal organi-
zation that may threaten safety and security at the prison. Id. at 92. This regulation was also
given approval because there was no easy alternative to the regulation and there was no inex-
pensive way to monitor inmate correspondence. Id. at 93. The marriage regulation, however,
had de minimus security concerns. Id. at 98. Nonetheless, prison officials may regulate the time
and circumstances under which a marriage would take place. Id. at 99.
301. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. In prisoners' rights cases the Supreme Court
applies the minimal scrutiny standard. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 88-91. The Court inquires
whether a prison regulation that burdens a fundamental right "is 'reasonably related' to legiti-
mate penological objectives, or whether it represents an 'exaggerated response' to those con-
cerns." Id. at 87. Even though this level of scrutiny gives the government the presumption that
the action is constitutional, state programs have been overruled.
302. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414-15 (1989). In Thornburgh, prisoners challenged
regulations governing receipt of subscription publications. Id. at 403. The Federal Bureau of
Prisons permitted prisoners to receive publications from the "outside," but authorized wardens
to reject an incoming publication that was found to be, "detrimental to the security, good order,
or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity." 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)
(1988). The Supreme Court affirmed the standard in Turner by stating that a regulation is "valid
if [it is] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Thornburg, 490 U.S. at 413 (cit-
ing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The Court reasoned the Turner standard to be valid because alterna-
tive means of expression were open to the inmate even though specific publications may be
prohibited. Id. at 414-15.
Historically, courts have recognized health, safety, and security interests as compelling inter-
ests in the prison context. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (upholding
the regulation of prisoners' receipt of incoming magazines); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93
(1987) (upholding the regulation of inmate-to-inmate correspondence); Forbes v. Triggs, 976
F.2d 308, 312-15 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a prison's interest in combatting narcotics
problems justified the periodic taking of inmate urine samples in order to conduct drug screens);
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992) (holding
that a prison's interest in preserving permanent identification records of felons outweighs the
intrusion involved in taking inmate blood samples); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1512-21
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a prison's interest in preventing transmission of HIV justified
segregation of HIV-positive inmates); St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 115-17 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(upholding a prison rule which prohibited inmates from wearing hats because inmates could hide
contraband in a hat).
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right is being asserted. '30 3 For example, the speech of a prison in-
mate, while it could not be regulated if the individual were not in
prison, may be regulated during incarceration. The Supreme Court
has held that inmates have the right to send and receive information,
subject to limits reasonably related to a legitimate penal interest.3°4
The Court has held that correspondence may be regulated between
inmates and their immediate family members who are not inmates,
and between inmates concerning only legal matters.305 The Court de-
cided that there are legitimate security interests justifying the inmate-
to-inmate correspondence rule, given the potential for communication
of escape plans and other violent acts. On the other hand, because
outgoing correspondence poses the least threat to internal prison se-
curity or other penal interests, the Court allows such
communication.306
Under the First Amendment, however, benefits cannot be condi-
tioned upon forced participation in a state-sponsored religion.307 The
Framers rejected an established church so much that they explicitly
included in the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. ' '30 8 The Framers included this
provision because they specifically feared: (1) government would cor-
rupt religion; (2) an established religion would repress competing
views; and (3) it would promote sectarian violence. 309 Because reli-
gious protection is so deeply rooted in our notions of freedom and
liberty, the state may not condition a benefit based on the burden of
religion.
Participation in A.A. has become an integral part of prison manage-
ment in many jurisdictions. 310 Nonetheless, judicial sentencing quali-
fies as a state action and, therefore, may not infringe constitutional
rights.311 The constitutional analysis must be affected by the fact that
the challenged program is a condition of probation or family visita-
tion.312 The choice between a longer sentence or separation from
family members and probation or visitation offers no choice at all-
303. Katya Lezin, Life at Lorton: An Examination of Prisoners' Rights at the District of Co-
lumbia Correctional Facilities, 5 B.U. Pua. INT. L.J. 165, 173 (1996).
304. Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.
305. Id. at 81-82, 91-93.
306. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 411-12.
307. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
309. Rutherford, supra note 291, at 915.
310. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69, 71-72 (1994).
312. But see Heinz R. Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Pro-
bation, 29 U. CH. L. REv. 483, 487-89 (1962).
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the inmate essentially chooses A.A. as the lesser of two evils.313 The
voluntary choice of probation or visitation renders impotent any con-
stitutional claim. When the State requires A.A. participation as a con-
dition to receive a benefit, and therefore conflicts with the
constitutional premise of separation of church and state, the choice
between privileges and no privileges alone cannot validate the State's
forced rehabilitation.
Conditioning a benefit otherwise available to citizens upon conduct
repugnant to his or her beliefs puts pressure on the adherent to violate
those beliefs, thereby violating the person's freedom of religion.314
Conditions must be constitutional even if the state has no obligation
to award the benefit.315 Therefore, if the state could not compel citi-
zens to go to A.A. directly, it cannot indirectly require such attend-
ance as a precondition to the benefits of probation or family visitation.
Although the state has no obligation to award prisoners benefits, it
cannot deny these benefits by setting conditions that conflict with the
inmate's religious beliefs or allows the State to establish a religion.
D. Squeeze Out the Lemon: The Coercion Test is Sweet
Alcoholics Anonymous-type treatment for prisoners is secular in
purpose-to rehabilitate the alcohol or substance abusing inmates to
prepare them for re-entry into society. While the principal effect of
the action arguably remains rehabilitation, entanglement between the
State and A.A. clearly results. There exists a cooperation between the
State and A.A.,316 coupled with the fact that the recipient has an obli-
gation to participate. Therefore, the mandated A.A. participation
should be challenged using the coercion test set forth in Lee v. Weis-
313. "The threat of sanctions being reimposed is definitely a strong factor in an individual's
cooperation with treatment," admitted the director of the Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Pro-
gram. BARENT F. LANDSTREET, THE DRINKING DRIVER: THE ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PRO-
GRAMS 59, 71 (1977).
314. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
315. Even though the State has no obligation to award unemployment benefits, it cannot im-
pose a condition which inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment
rights of expression. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963). The State cannot indirectly,
via conditions, "produce a result which the State could not command directly." Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
316. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), in upholding cooperation between the govern-
ment and religious institutions, the Supreme Court stated "there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other." Id. at 312. The widespread practice of making referrals to A.A.
rather than creating a state neutral program, arguably represents dependency by the state on a
religious organization. The First Amendment should deny "to every denomination any advan-
tage from getting control of public policy." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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man317  rather than the Lemon test,318  and, thus, found
unconstitutional.
First, and foremost, the Lemon test should not be used in cases
where the government creates or sponsors a religion or religious prac-
tice and then mandates, forces, or coerces a person to partake in such
ideologies. The Lemon court itself noted that, "[slome relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable. ' 319 As
a result: "Entanglement must be excessive before it runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause. '' 320 Those who object to A.A. participation
would have to prove the State excessively interfered in the establish-
ment or encouragement of a religion or religious practices. As
demonstrated in the Boyd, Stafford, Feasel, Jones and O'Connor cases,
an objector will most likely not be able to demonstrate excessive en-
tanglement. Courts have found the interest in rehabilitation out-
weighs a state's encouragement of religious practices.
When deciding the constitutionality of the state-mandated A.A.
participation, it is important to note a recent statement by dissenting
justices of the Supreme Court:
"When the government favors a particular religion or sect, the dis-
advantage to all others is obvious, but even the favored religion may
fear being "taint[ed] ... with a corrosive secularism." The favored
religion may be compromised as political figures reshape the reli-
gion's beliefs for their own purposes; it may be reformed as govern-
ment largesse brings government regulation. 321
The Court viewed government approval of religion as a reinforcement
of the religious message and as a carrier of that message, thereby ex-
cluding those of less favored views.322 The Court warned and re-
minded government why the Framers incorporated the religion
clauses into the First Amendment:
The human tendency, of course, is to forget the hard lessons, and to
overlook the history of governmental partnership with religion
when a cause is worthy, and bureaucrats have programs. "That ten-
dency to forget is the reason for having the Establishment Clause...
in the hope of stopping the corrosion before it starts. '323
317. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
318. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
319. Id. at 614.
320. Id. at 613; see, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988) (holding no excessive
entanglement where government reviews the adolescent counseling program set up by the reli-
gious institutions that are grantees, reviews the materials used by such grantees, and monitors
the program by periodic visits).
321. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2020 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Lee, 505
U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
322. Id. at 2021.
323. Id. at 2020-21 (emphasis added).
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There are two types of Establishment Clause cases. In the first
group of cases, the State is forcing a person who does not subscribe to
certain religious tenets to support or to participate in observing these
tenets. These cases are considered "outsider" cases, where the State is
imposing religion on an unwilling subject. For example, in Torcaso v.
Watkins,324 the Court struck down a statute that required individuals
appointed to public office in that state to declare their belief in the
existence of God.325 The second group of cases concerns religious
groups seeking some benefit from the state, or the state wishing to
confer a benefit on such a group. For example, in Everson v. Board of
Education,326 the Court upheld a state statute that provided publicly
funded transportation services for parochial school students.327 In this
case, no one was forcing families to send their children to parochial
schools; the "establishment effect" came from the use of the pro-
testing taxpayers' dollars to help the students or their families.
Much debate has raged on the second type of cases: those elusive
"insider" cases in which the State has taken some affirmative action
that helps existing religions groups. 328 These are the cases for which
the Lemon test was designed. 329 However, when a person alleges that
the State coerces him or her, under threat of meaningful penalties, to
attend religious meetings, then the court must look to a different
test.330 When a court applies the Lemon test to claims arising from
mandated A.A. participation, the court does not take into account the
substantial Establishment Clause jurisprudence the Supreme Court
has developed since Lemon. Whether under the general, psychologi-
cal or legal approaches to the coercion test, if a plaintiff claims that
the State is coercing him to subscribe to a religion, the court must only
look at three crucial points: "[F]irst, has the state acted; second, does
the action amount to coercion; and third, is the object of coercion reli-
gious or secular?" 331
324. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
325. Id. at 495-96.
326. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
327. Id. at 17-18.
328. Id. (citing Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the
Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 323).
329. Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996).
330. Justice Blackmun wrote in his concurring opinion in Lee: "[A]Ithough our precedents
make clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause
violation, it is sufficient. Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious
indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
331. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479.
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With respect to mandated A.A. participation for prisoners, all three
criteria are met. First, the State, acting through its prison wardens,
chooses A.A. as the provider for drug and alcohol treatment.
Although the State does not, itself, preach the tenets of God, it gives
A.A. the power to do so. Second, prisoners are ultimately coerced to
attend A.A. meetings. Just as a high school graduation ceremony is
"in a fair and real sense obligatory, '' 332 so is attending A.A. in return
for early parole or family visitation rights. An inmate has no real
choice-comply with the State requirement or remain in prison, possi-
bly indefinitely, without the loving smile from his or her family. The
argument that A.A. attendance in exchange for early parole or family
visitation is voluntary, is extremely formalistic. Third, a straightfor-
ward reading of the Twelve Steps clearly demonstrates that the steps
are based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Be-
ing.333 True, the God may refer to Jesus Christ, Allah, Buddha or the
Holy Trinity, but the Twelve Steps, nonetheless, consistently refer to
"God, as we understood Him. '334 Even if the steps are expanded to
include polytheistic ideals, or animistic philosophies, they are still
"fundamentally based on a religious concept of a Higher Power. '335
Furthermore, the counseling meetings are permeated with explicit
religious content. Participants are told to pray to God for help in
overcoming their addiction,336 and meetings are opened and closed
with group prayer.337 These activities belie with a heavy emphasis on
spirituality and prayer. "This is not the same as when religion is not
struck by the insertion of the words 'under God' in the Pledge of Alle-
giance, or other incidental references that the courts have upheld, be-
cause people can refuse to say God without penalty. '338
IV. THE REALITY OF IT ALL-BALANCING PUBLIC POLICY WITH
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The partnership between states and mandated A.A. treatment un-
constitutionally entangles church and state. However, as the Court
intimated in Zorach v. Clauson,339 "[t]he problem, like many
332. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586.
333. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 480.
334. Id.
335. Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1997).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 437 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Illinois public school teachers could lead the Pledge of Allegiance without violating
the First Amendment so long as pupils were free not to participate).
339. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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problems in constitutional law, is one of degree. '340 No matter how
well the Court articulates constitutional guarantees, the judiciary nev-
ertheless will still balance the governmental interest served by the
program against the burdens on constitutional rights posed by the
State action. 341 Since 1890,342 the Supreme Court has clarified that
even deeply held religious or spiritual beliefs can succumb to impor-
tant public policies.343
The broadest government policy involved in state-mandated A.A.
treatment is the State's interest in reducing the number of drug and
alcohol related crimes so as to reduce the number of inmates in
prison. In New York, substance abuse treatment programs "are fix-
tures in the state's 69 prisons: 15,000 inmates, or two in nine, go
through substance-abuse rehabilitation every year. '344 According to
an article in the New York Times, "[a]bout a third of the participants
[in the treatment programs] had been sent to prison for drug convic-
tions, but another 40 percent have other drug-related problems: they
committed a burglary so they could fence the goods they stole for cash
for drugs. '345 Inmates who fail the drug test when they arrive at the
prison are also sent for treatment. 346 Rehabilitation programs address
the problem at its roots and attempt to prevent problems of recidivist
occurrences. While the strong government interest prison manage-
ment compels some type of rehabilitation treatment, it does not neces-
sarily demand A.A. to be that provider. The state interest in
compelling A.A. specifically, is unjustifiable.347
The absolute importance of separation of church and state should
be, and is, guaranteed under the Constitution. The unconditioned, ex-
press prohibition of state actions which violate the Establishment
340. Id. at 314.
341. "If the abridgment is very serious, the social goals can never be worth the constitutional
price." Rachel S. Lieberman, Humpty Dumpty and Government Social Welfare Services, 6 J.L. &
POL. 601, 622 (1989-90).
342. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343-48 (1890) (holding that the freedom of religion
does not prohibit laws forbidding polygamy).
343. Id.; see, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (approving a policy
which prohibited use of sacramental peyote as adequate policy grounds to infringe upon free
exercise rights); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (indicating that even the government
interest in maintaining a uniform system of benefits administration overcomes religious beliefs).
344. James Barron, Saying A.A. Is Religious, Court Lets Inmate Skip It, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1996, at B6.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Richard Kohler, a former New York City corrections commissioner, now a professor at
the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, stated: "It's very difficult for the state to show there is a
legitimate state interest in forcing someone into a rehabilitation program when there's no evi-
dence it works in the first place." Barron, supra note 344, at B6.
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Clause are also denoted in the First Amendment. Still, one might ar-
gue that only a small percentage of intrusion occurs, or that violations
are minor because the responsible source is a quasi-religious organiza-
tion, not a church. In conducting such a balancing test, however, the
minor or subtle nature of the First Amendment infringement does not
dilute its importance:
[I]t is no defense to urge that religious practices here may be rela-
tively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach
of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon be-
come a raging torrent and, in the words of James Madison, "it is
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. ' 348
Because the freedom of belief, as well as a ban on state-religion estab-
lishment, is a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation," 349 the in-
trusion on any of these First Amendment rights should be accorded
the highest value of protection.
Faced with the choice between jail without probation (or family vis-
its) and conditioned privileges, the state compulsion to attend A.A. is
unquestionable. Denying probation or visitation to those who refuse
to participate in a state-established religious exercise clearly demon-
strates the State's power of coercion. Although the government's pol-
icy interest in rehabilitating substance abusers is high, the interest in
rehabilitating inmates through A.A. participation specifically, without
exceptions or alternatives, is not acceptable.
Infringements of constitutional protections caused by the mandated
A.A. treatment program require only minor modifications. Such
modifications would allow governments to maintain rehabilitation
programs thereby reducing recidivism in prisons while still preserving
constitutional protection of church and state.
The easiest and most favorable modification is for the prison to of-
fer an alternative that serves the same counseling and support-group
function of A.A., but which lacks the religious or indoctrinating char-
acteristics.350 The option for alternative rehabilitation programs could
be offered to all prisoners, or just those who express an objection to
A.A. One such type of alternative currently exists-Rational Recov-
ery. Rational Recovery, a support group which helps keep alcoholics
348. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
349. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
350. In many cases, an alternative to A.A. may be geographically unavailable which would
create a de facto compulsion to A.A.: "For over 40 years after its inception in 1935, Alcoholics
Anonymous was the only national self-help organization for alcoholics." CULT OR CURE?, supra
note 241, at 123. Numerous alternatives to A.A. now exist, including Women for Sobriety, Men
for Sobriety, Save Our Selves/Secular Organizations for Sobriety, and Rational Recovery, id. at
123-27; not to mention private, individual counseling.
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sober, was designed specifically to offer a philosophical alternative to
A.A.351 Rather than requiring powerlessness and turning to God as
prerequisites to recovery, Rational Recovery focuses on the individ-
ual's responsibility of overcoming alcoholism and other addictions. 352
This program also avoids "replacing one addiction with another, ' 353
meaning participants need not continue to attend the counseling ses-
sions after attaining confident sobriety, unlike A.A. which maintains
the road to recovery is a life-long process of counseling sessions. Pri-
vate counseling could also be a satisfactory alternative, whether at a
medical facility away from the prison or as conducted by an in-house
(prison) trained professional.
The creation of a neutral treatment program presents an obvious
cure for the State; but this proposal instantly creates fear and resist-
ance in the present atmosphere of budgetary restraint. Establishing
the legislative and financial support necessary for such an effort may
not impossible; however, it is unlikely. Furthermore, removing the
Twelve Steps from the options for treatment altogether is not a wise
option. Strong advocates for A.A. believe that if A.A. is no longer
offered as a treatment program for substance abusing inmates-that
would be like "'throwing the baby out with the bath water.' ' 354 These
advocates rightly believe if the state removes A.A. from the prison
system, inmates' sobriety and recovery will be at risk because of the
absence of this important support mechanism.355 Aside from the diffi-
culties of developing a purely religion-neutral program, cures to the
constitutional violation of compulsory A.A. are logical, readily avail-
able, and capable of implementation. The prisons must simply require
the inmate to participate in a counseling program that is effective in
rehabilitating alcoholics and drug addicts, rather than specifically re-
quiring participation in A.A.
CONCLUSION
Alcoholics Anonymous clearly fits the functional definition of reli-
gion. Regardless of whether God is the traditional Christian God, it is
a higher power to which A.A. participants must "turn [their] will and
351. Ron Gasbarro, Another Road to Recovery; A New Group Offers Alternative to AA,
WASH. POST, May 14, 1991, at D5.
352. Id. Rational Recovery has over 600 treatment groups and 10,000 clients in the United
States and Canada. Self-Help Advocates Say Field Must Escape A.A. Tentacles, ALCOHOLISM &
DRUG ABUSE WEEKLY, June 24, 1996, at 1, 5.
353. Gasborro, supra note 351, at D5.
354. Barron, supra note 344, at B6 (quoting Abukarriem Shabazz, president of the New York
State Association of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Treatment Providers).
355. Id.
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[their] lives over" 356 in order to remove their flaws. Because members
must first admit powerlessness, 357 their lives and well being depend
upon this power and the A.A. support system. Because A.A. goes
beyond a mere ideology into the realm of religion, A.A. as a condition
for probation or family visitation implicates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
While Alcoholics Anonymous plays a vital role in rehabilitating
thousands of alcoholics, it is religious, spiritual and indoctrinating in
nature and practice. A.A. participation as a condition of conferring
benefits to a prisoner is impermissible coercion by the State. This
compulsion clearly violates the Establishment Clause because it al-
lows the government to endorse a religion that is adopted by the in-
doctrinating Twelve-Step program. Furthermore, a constitutional
infringement, which attacks one of the most fundamental notions of
the United States-the separation of church and state-is not, and
cannot be justified by a specific compelling interest of the State.
Judges should take heed from the Second and Seventh Circuit Appel-
late Courts and use the coercion test any time the government forces,
compels or coerces a religion into society. In order to avoid a consti-
tutional blunder, legislatures and prison officials should offer religion-
neutral alternatives to A.A.-based drug and alcohol rehabilitation
programs, thereby allowing effective rehabilitation of substance abus-
ing inmates without violating the clear command of the First Amend-
ment Establishment Clause.
356. CULT OR CURE?, supra note 241, at 67 (the Third Step).
357. Id. at 65 (the First Step).
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